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ABSTRACT

Unwritten Law: Resilient Management in Latin American Artisanal Fisheries
by
Brandon Chapman, Master of Social Science
Utah State University, 2004

Major Professor: Dr. Douglas Jackson-Smith
Department: Sociology

Latin American small-scale fishery production is crucial to local communities that
count on fish as a key source of protein in daily consumption and for supplying the
increasing demand for exported high-value species in the first world. Many small-scale
fishing communities have exhibited various forms of informal institutions that serve to
manage rights to the fishery, a common-pool resource (CPR). An emerging theme in the
CPR management literature is that there are certain types of institutions that exist in
successful informal management contexts. Seven case studies from small-scale fishing
communities in Latin America are analyzed in order to determine if these model
management institutions are supported. These case studies are then analyzed to determine
what accounts for resilient informal management institutions in the face of commercial
and outsider encroachment. The thesis is that robust shoreline activities promote
reciprocity that allows for rapid collective action in the face of external threats.
(135 pages)
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Small-scale fishing has historically been and continues to constitute a large
portion of fish production for both first and third world peoples (McGoodwin 1990).
With half the world's fish trade currently produced out of third world nations, 94 percent
of the world's fishing fleets being defined as small-scale, and 65 percent of the world's
fleet defined as artisanal, it is crucial to understand the problems-facing third world
fisheries, especially the often overlooked low-technology sectors (F AO 2002). With
about 27,000 large-scale commercial fishers in the world constituting 6 percent of the
total amount of fishers, that leaves hundreds of thousands of fishers self-employed as
small-scale operators (FAO 2002). In Peru for example, 70 percent offish food for direct
human consumption is from artisanal fishers (Prado and Drew 1999). Net revenues from
fish trade (exports minus imports) by developing nations recently reached $17.7 billion, a
figure larger than that earned from their exports of such popular crops as tea, rice, cocoa,
and coffee combined (F AO 2004).
The percentage of the world's maritime production contributed by Latin
American nations has risen since 1988 from 19 percent to over 22 percent and the region
continues to be the largest contributor to world production of the eleven world fishery
regions (FAO 2002). Aggregate data from 28 Latin American members of the
intergovernmental organization the 'Latin American Economic System' (LAES) shows
that while marine fishery production has decreased since 1996, the value of fish exports
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has doubled since 1988 from 3.1 billion to 6.5 billion measured in U.S. dollars (FAa
2002). One of the five emerging trends identified in worldwide fisheries by the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAa) is that in developing nations, trade
flows will reflect the export of high-cost / high-value species and the import oflow-cost /
low-value species (FAa 2002).
There have been declines in both total marine production in Latin America
recently and in per capita production across fishing sectors since the 1980s. Couple that
drop in production with declines in income and efficiency among the small-scale sector
and it becomes apparent that third world small-scale fishers are under increased pressure
to maintain or increase their output of high-cost / high-value species, even though
increased amounts of these most valued harvests are being exported out of the
community and out of the hands oflocal consumers. Maintaining a stable level of
production to meet growing demand at home and abroad is increasingly difficult as the
commercial sector has sharply increased their harvesting efforts in or near what have
traditionally been small-scale fishing territories in the last half-century. These territories
are most often adjacent to and informally claimed and managed by small-scale fishers in
rural communities. Low-tech fishers, often residing in a rural peripheral community with
weak backward economic linkages, must then compete with much more technologically
sophisticated craft for a declining number of fish. Third world fishers are facing such
emerging problems in this new era of commercial encroachment.
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1.1: Emerging Multifaceted Problems in Fisheries
Fishing problems are multifaceted, but small-scale fisheries and the fishers that
operate within them are especially vulnerable to these problems because of their
peripheral position in the emerging era of commercial encroachment and international
market demands. Decreases in efficiency and productivity in formerly abundant fish
catch areas, increased technologies allowing for fleet effectiveness at cross-continental
distances, and national and international industry legal structures adopted to increase
foreign and national commercial investment and productivity have encouraged
commercial encroachment on small-scale fishing communities. Small-scale fishers are
thus being increasingly marginalized and specialized. Many must choose between
competing with more technologically efficient and financially backed fleets or becoming
integrated by these commercial operations into national and international fish markets.
These external factors, coupled with fish stock depletion 'spillover' effects and rising
internal conflict due to externally influenced marginalization and specialization have
influenced the structure and effectiveness of informal institutions created by small-scale
fisher communities to manage their fishery.
There is an extensive literature that analyzes how many small-scale fishing
communities have created and changed unwritten rules for rights to local fishing
resources in response to these internal and external pressures. For example, fishers in a
small community vulnerable to fish stock depletion can institute certain property rights
systems. Fishing communities having problems with commercial encroachment can
organize themselves to monitor and defend clearly defined fishing territories. These
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infonnal management institutions take an endless variety of fonns, but there are some
regularities that have been documented. Ostrom (1990), Baland and Platteau (1996), and
others have constructed theoretical models of several institutional design principles
associated with successful small-scale, user-managed common-pool resources. As
expanded on in the next chapter, there is an extensive literature that argues that all of
these problems can be solved, or at least decreased and lessened, by appropriate and
effective institutional design and management practices.

1.2: Research Outline
There is not only a Crisis in the World's Fisheries (Me Goodwin 1990), but also a
crisis in infonnal fisheries management related to increases in population, consumption,
technology proliferation, and inequalities (Burger, et. al. 2001). As the continued viability
of often vulnerable informal management institutions in small-scale communities are
being threatened, we need to properly understand under what conditions certain
institutions succeed or fail. I began this study with two broad research questions:
I. Do the often cited Ostrom (1990) and Baland and Platteau (1996) models for
infonnal common-pool resource (CPR) management hold up in the case of
Latin American fisheries?
2. What factors increase the resilience oflocal management systems in the face
of pressures from commercial encroachment in Latin American small-scale
fisheries?
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The purpose of this paper is to show that there are unique cultural and social patterns in
artisanal fishery communities that promote resiliency in the face of external threats. My
thesis is that 'shoreline reciprocity networks' account for resiliency to external
threats in Latin American artisanal fisheries. Ostrom's seven principles are effective

in promoting successful management practices in Latin American artisanal fisheries in
regards to maintaining traditional environmental, economic, and social health and
relationships. Thus, CPR management institutions matter, but so do specific aspects of
artisanal fishing culture that contribute to the resiliency of such institutions.
This chapter serves as a short introduction to the emerging and immediate
problems of fisheries worldwide, trends in third world and Latin American fisheries, and
how those problems and trends are addressed by the research questions. Chapter II
provides a brief review of the CPR management literature, defines relevant CPR
concepts, and provides an overview of debates on property rights systems and theories of
creation and change in CPR institutions. Chapter III provides a synthesis of
characteristics common to fisheries and notes how these pose unique problems for local
fishery management. Characteristics of third world small-scale fisheries are unique and
separate them from the commercial sector and other natural-resource use communities.
Chapter IV outlines seven Latin American small-scale fishery case studies drawn from
various previously published works. Chapter V concludes by addressing the two research
questions and how these case studies provide examples of the specific adaptive responses
user groups adopt to maintain their traditional management systems in the face of
external threats.
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CHAPTER II
COMMON-POOL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT THEORY

There is an extensive literature that outlines how the various problems of fisheries
summarized in chapter I are created, alleviated, and / or mediated by social and legal
resource management institutions (McEvoy 1986). Much of the recent literature on smallscale fisheries has documented the various forms oflocally designed management
systems (Dyer and McGoodwin 1994). Ostrom (2001) provides the best synthesis of both
resource and user characteristics that influence the likelihood that local users will create
such informal management institutions in the first place. In this paper, I am more
concerned with how such management systems succeed or fail once created and how they
respond to external threats.
There are three main sections in this chapter. Section 2.1 defines and clarifies key
concepts used through the rest of the paper and that are widely used (and often misused)
in the theoretical CPR management literature. Section 2.2 briefly summarizes the
historical development of the major theoretical paradigms and debates in the CPR
management and property rights literatures. Section 2.3 analyzes factors influencing
success or failure in the maintenance and adaptation of CPR management. This chapter
provides a framework of analysis for understanding the management institutions found in
small-scale fishing communities. Such a theoretical literature review provides a solid
base from which to understand the problems in small-scale fisheries associated with
threats from non-local fishing pressure.
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2.1: CPR Concepts
A major problem with the CPR literature is that theorists have used certain
concepts in vastly different ways. As Dolsak and Ostrom (2003) have most recently
suggested, CPR researchers need to build a clear and precise conceptual foundation in
order to effectively understand and disseminate research to each other. A common and
clear conceptual language is particularly important when integrating works across diverse
disciplines, from both the physical and social sciences (Pawson and Dovers 2003).
A concept I use often in this paper is 'institution'. By 'institutions', I mean rules
or constraints that are implemented in society in order to ensure compliance with a
groups' decisions. With respect to CPRs, 'institutions' are the rules and conventions that
establish peoples' relationships to natural resources (Gibbs and Bromley 1989).
Institutions can be formal (codified laws) or informal (norms of behavior, conventions,
self-imposed codes of conduct) that mold interactions between user groups and a CPR
(North 1994).

It is crucial to distinguish between 'common-property' and 'common-pool', two
often used and interchanged concepts. Dietz et a1. (2002) define common-property as a
certain type of resource management system imposed by users, not necessarily a
characteristic of the resource itself. Common-pool is used to describe the resource itself.
A common-pool resource is a resource that is unbounded. Examples of CPRs include
ocean waters, pasturelands / rangelands, and the earth's atmosphere. Management of
CPRs typically creates dilemmas concerning how to prevent the potentially unlimited
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exploitation and degradation that could result from unbounded access and withdrawal
conditions.
Common-pool resources can be managed through different property rights
systems: open-access, common-property, individual private property, regional or state
government owned property, or a mixture of some or all of these (Table 1). Thus,
common-pool can mean open or closed access since 'common-pool resource' is what the
acronym CPR stands for and management can be the common-property closed access
systems and other institutions implemented on the CPR.

Table 1. Types of Property Rights.
1. Open Access
Absence of well-defined property rights. Resource often unregulated and free to
everyone.
2. Communal Property
Resource held by community of users. User community excludes outsiders.
Users may self-regulate.
3. State Property
Resource rights held by government. Government can regulate access and
exploitation. General public may have access as granted by government.
Government can use force to enforce laws and even subsidize use by some.
4. Private Property
Individual has the right to particularly appropriate uses of the resource as
socially defined. Individual also has the right to exclude others from these uses.
Sometimes includes the right to prevent uses by others that interfere with his /
her rights and the right to rent or sell the property to others.

(Adapted from Feeny et. al. 1990).
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'Management' in this paper refers to humans regulating human behavior
(Acheson 1981). This usually involves the creation and maintenance of social
institutions, whether informal or formal, to establish rules for property rights (Schlager
and Ostrom 1993) and to control and allocate resource use. In this paper, management is
a broader term than institutions. 'Management' refers to a set of specific 'institutional
arrangements'. Institutions are the rules; management is the set of rules (thus, I refer to
management 'systems' and management 'institutions').
Because fishery resources are naturally chaotic and difficult to control they pose
unique organizational challenges (McGoodwin 200 1). Such difficulties are a result of
many factors, including the featurelessness of the resource, the open-access nature of
open waters, and the fact that the extracted unit (the fish) are most of the time hidden
from view and thus levels of extraction and exploitation are not easily estimated visually.
Most international fisheries are pure 'open-access' systems with virtually no regulation
from users or state actors. However, local, regional, and national fisheries have various
forms of communal, state, and individual property rights systems. Understanding and
further analyzing the management institutions of fisheries can have profound policy
implications regarding what types of institutions work, do not work, what contexts allow
for institutional adaptability to external threats, and in what contexts such successes and
failures are apparent.
'Management' is defined rather broadly here and it is important to distinguish
between what it is and is not. Management institutions should not be confused with the
popular 'cooperative' organizations used in a majority of fishery development projects
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(Sabella 1980). There is also a distinction in fisheries development between capture
fishery projects and aquaculture projects, where sometimes aquaculture (the fenced in
raising of certain species offish) is promoted in a community also in a cooperative form
of organization (Bort and Sabella 1992). The United Nations FAO is one of the most
prominent policy designers and development project implementers concerning fisheries
worldwide and it has historically viewed the cooperative as the best one-shot model of
fishery development success (Meynell 1984, Jentoft 1986, Sabella and Bort 1991). The
cooperative has also constituted the majority of fishery projects implemented by the
World Bank (Pollnac 1991).
'Cooperatives' can be either user-organized or implemented top-down by a
regional government, state government, or an international development agency such as
the FAO and are often created to reduce risk and uncertainty. Certainly this equates with
management as do the social institutions often created by the formation of a community
fishing cooperative. However, there is an important difference. Cooperatives do involve
collective action among fishers, but often in the form of pooling economic and
technological resources for the sake of maintaining or regaining control over prices
received for fish catch and control over fishing equipment used in the community. A
common example in Latin America is artisanal fishermen pooling their money as
collateral for bank loans in order to purchase multiple outboard motors for the collective
and for 'cooperative' use since many of these economically peripheral fishers do not have
the necessary capital alone to purchase such equipment (Sabella 1980). Fishery
'management', on the other hand, does not necessarily involve such pooling of resources
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or gaining control of external markets. Also, 'management' involves regulating human
behavior 'on the waters', while 'cooperatives' are not always associated with such
institutional regulation of fishing effort. So 'cooperatives' are more concerned with
community organization and institutions 'on-shore' (pooling resources and controlling
external markets), while 'management' exists more abstractly and is concerned with
regulating 'on the water' behavior.
There are three main types of CPR management systems: folk (often referred to as
'traditional' also), state, and co-management (Acheson 1989). Folk management systems
are the focus of this paper, where local community members and / or local resource users
develop and maintain rules for rights over the particular CPR (Berkes and Farvar 1989).
State management is where government at any level (international, national, regional,
local) is the only authority for developing and maintaining such rules. Co-management
lies between these two extreme ends of the management spectrum and is a combination
of these two systems, where authority is shared between local resource users and one or
various levels of government.
Management systems can be informal or formal. Formal systems have written
rules, while informal systems do not. Most folk systems are informal and most state
systems are formal. That is, the CPR case study literature has shown that the state
formally codifies various management institutions onto paper, which legitimizes such
institutions in the event they are challenged legally. Meanwhile, folk management
institutions often do not exist formally and instead exist cognitively by local resource
users. Rules are enforced, other users monitored, rulebreakers sanctioned through
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informal unwritten social norms. Unwritten law can take many forms, from more
common-property to private property for example.
There are four main types of property rights systems recognized by almost all of
the existing CPR literature: open-access, communal, state, and private (Burger, et. al.
200 1, Feeny, et. al. 1990, see Table 1). Each or combinations of these systems can be
present along the two scales of 'informal to formal' and 'folk to state'. These four
systems differ along four dimensions: (a) nature of ownership, (b) rights and
responsibilities of owners, (c) rules of use, and (d) the center of control (Burger, et. al.
200 1). These serve as conceptual anchors and do not always exist in singular and pure
forms in real-world CPR situations. Edwards and Steins (1998) provide an excellent
overview of 'complex commons', which more accurately represents how common-pool
resources are operated under various property rights systems in the real world. They show
that ePRs are generally mixed systems combining two or more ofthese concepts (for
example, some individuals may hold special private areas, while the rest of the resource
is held in common or by the state). Also, some users may perceive part of the CPR to be
open-access, while it is actually held formally or informally under property rights.
Thus, 'complex commons' are those cases where a bounded CPR has either
multiple property rights systems existing simultaneously or different users perceiving and
attempting to use areas as open-access when they are in fact held under certain property
rights. Different users use some ePRs for different extractive purposes, such as a river
flowing in front of a community being used for both fishing by coastline fishers and for
irrigation water by inland agriculturalists. These cases of 'multiple-use commons' are
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often where multiple property rights systems and their respective management
institutions are found. In these cases, it is not only the heterogeneity and multiplicity of
users that must be taken into account, but also the heterogeneity and multiplicity of uses
(with their respective management systems).
This synthesis of definitions across the CPR management literature is useful for
developing a conceptual framework that has general applicability while maintaining most
of the main terms used historically. In the next section, I explore how these concepts have
been utilized in larger theoretical debates on why and how certaiu CPR management
institutions are created, maintained, and changed, with emphasis on the historical
development of the major paradigms and debates in the CPR management literature.

2.2: Debates Over CPR Management
I divide the historical trajectory of the CPR management theory literature into two
main eras, the focus on rational choice theorizing from the 1950s to mid-1980s and the
rise of collective action management and critique of rational choice theorizing from the
mid-1980s to the present. While there is some disagreement, these two categories
represent the main classifications of CPR literature over time and represent how CPR
theorizing has been centered on rational choice theory since its origins and the various
critiques of that theory arising in the mid-1980s. While a handful of empirical case
studies began critiquing rational choice theory in small-steps through the 70s and 80s, it
was not until 1986 with the publishing of the National Research Council's Proceedings of

the Conference on Common Property Resource Management and Arthur McEvoy's The
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Fisherman's Problem that such critiques of rational choice CPR theorizing were

synthesized and articulated within the larger debate.

2.2.1: Rational Choice Origins

The main CPR theoretical debate has historically centered on rational choice
theory. The origin of CPR management as a topic with its own distinct literature area and
associated specialized theorists and scholars was the publication of Garrett Hardin's
classic article "The Tragedy of the Commons" (1968). The thrust of Hardin's argument is
that common-property (which he sees as a CPR lacking regulation and interpersonal
information) will tend to be over-exploited until it becomes unsustainable for future
generations. This is because Hardin applies rational choice theory in this article, that
individuals are self-interested acting to maximize their own gain. Hardin's solution to the
tragedy is "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon" (p. 1247). Hardin's 'mutual
coercion' represents a simplified pre-cursor to the user management institutions favored
by so many subsequent CPR theorists.
The 'fisherman's problem' (McEvoy 1986) is an example of Hardin's tragedy as
seen in relatively unregulated oceans. Under open-access conditions, fishers of all types
and abilities know that the other fishers harvesting the same waters will profit from their
catch and that takes away from their potential catch and profit. Economists using rational
choice theory define the 'fisherman's problem' as when fishers are in competition to
harvest as much as they can as efficiently as they can since they know that their potential
harvest will be decreased as others fish in the same waters without limitations. When
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there is no individually held value, as in many open-access CPRs, there is no reason to
sustain the resource.
More recent rational choice theorists have applied these earlier models to
individual and group action concerning CPR management systems (Ostrom 1990, McCay
and Acheson 1987). These theorists adopt the perspective that a CPR presents 'social
dilemmas' because of their assumptions that a CPR is a resource susceptible to openaccess exploitation, as self-interested utility maximizing individuals will necessarily
attempt to use as much of the resource as beneficial to them and thus create externalities
for other users. Even when a community organizes collectively to create informal
institutions for managing the resource, this creates a public good wherein all community
users can benefit from the public good without necessarily contributing. Although
monitoring and sanctioning rules can be agreed upon to solve this free-rider dilemma, this
process of rule enforcing itself creates another level of public good dilemma (Ostrom
2001). From a rational choice theory of collective action, resolving such 'social
dilemmas' is at the root of all management (Ostrom 1998). This is why rational choice
theorists often use repeated game theories to reproduce and solve such dilemmas.

2.2.2: Private Property Rights
Initial problems of over-exploitation, hyper-competition, and economic
inefficiency noted by rational choice theory often explain why users come together in
voluntary association to create CPR management institutions. Such management
institutions can protect the resource by closing access to certain users. Private property
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rights can create individual user or user group incentives to sustain the value (and
therefore, the extractable unit integrity) of the resource for future generations because the
user(s) owns all or part of the resource. Thus, one positive argument for private property
rights is it allows individuals to plan for the future.
Two of the earliest advocates of private property rights in fisheries were
economists H. Scott Gordon and Anthony Scott. Gordon theorized that the marginal
return from fishing is zero, which explained why many fishers are so poor. This is
because under open-access conditions costs rise proportionally with the amount of effort
expended. He argued that a closed-access system limiting entry should be devised
because maximum economic return can be achieved only by balancing efforts / costs with
amount of catch, and by eliminating hyper-competition that continually reduces the
proportion of benefits as more effort is needed to harvest more fish under an increasing
number of entering fishers. Privatizing the fishery would then maximize economic return
and ecologically conserve the fishery (Gordon 1954). Scott has made the same claim,
initially in his 1955 article and subsequently in his later works (Scott 1955, 1979, 1988).
There is considerable debate between advocates for either private property rights
or common-property rights as a means for conserving natural resources. On one side,
Stevenson (1991) argues that private property is more efficient than common-property,
assuming that transaction costs are equal. Simmons and Schwartz-Shea (1993) argue that
private property arises out of conservation concerns. The private property argument is
based on two key assumptions: that private property rights are created as a response to
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open-access problems and that such management institution creation is mainly for the
purposes of conservation.
At the same time, the conservation of a resource has been the main reason for
local CPR resource users to create common-property management institutions and to
justify the costs that follow with creating, enforcing, and changing them. However,
Durrenberger and King (2000) point out that informal management institutions are not
necessarily created out of a conservation ethic to facilitate sustainable use of a CPR.
Rather, the environmental, economic, and social dynamics that illfluence the creation of
such informal management needs further research (2000). Certainly, some informal
management institutions have no clear connection to conservation and sustainability
issues. One example is the often-studied coastal fishermen of Caye Caulker just off the
mainland shore of Belize (King 1997a, 1997b, 2000). However, many CPR scholars
agree that whatever the initial motivation for creation or change to new forms of
management institutions, the resulting maintenance of such informal institutions can curb
environmental degradation that may have otherwise been inevitable under open-access
conditions (Burger, et. al. 2001).
Researchers that take a less economic approach to CPR management have even
argued that fisheries in particular are difficult, if not impossible, to divide up into private
property and therefore automatically require collective management institutions (Burger,
et. al. 2001). However, there are numerous case studies of rather successful informal
management based on private fishing territories and 'visual triangulation' that rebut this
side of the debate. See chapter III (section 3.3) for an overview of 'visual triangulation'
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and chapter IV for Latin American examples of such case studies (Cordell 1984,
Sutherland 1986).

2.2.3: Critiques of Rational Choice
Scholars of various other disciplines increasingly critiqued the rational choice
model beginning in the 1970s as not adequately accounting for societal structures or
forces (McEvoy 1986). What Hardin misconceptualized was the nature of the 'commons'
itself. Rather than being an inherent flaw of common-property, open-access and poorly
defined property rights are what really caused Hardin's 'tragedy' (Burger, et. al. 2001).
His article should have been titled "The Tragedy of Open-Access".
Aside from Hardin's well-documented 'tragedy', there is also the 'tragedy of the
anti-commons'. This is when the tragedy of over-exploitation occurs within individual
private property rights, a closed-access system. This can be due to simple poor
management by a private owner and is often cited by advocates of common-property.
Even when resources are divisible and privately owned, ensuring conservation to protect
the well-being and use needs of future generations cannot be accomplished by individuals
acting out of self-interest alone (Burger et. al. 2001).
Thus, critics of Hardin have focused on his general lack of accounting for
collective action. At the same time, critiques of early rational choice theorists question
their behavioral assumptions and faith in private property. Ostrom (200 I) is one who has
questioned the assumptions of these earliest rational choice 'economic' type theories of
fisheries, including beliefs that:
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• The resource unit extracted is highly predictable and consistent

• Users are homogenous in assets, skills, discount rates, and cultural views
•

Users are short-term profit maximizers that possess complete information

• Users act independently without coordinating their activities
These assumptions of rational choice theory often reduce CPR management to a one-shot
or repeated game theoretic, such as a prisoner's dilemma (Dasgupta and Heal 1979). It
was the main perspective on CPR management through the mid-1980s when more
examples arose showing an absence of private property rights in favor of communal
property, and variables explaining the heterogeneity of actors became more defined
(Ostrom 2001, Petrzelka and Bell 2000).
Numerous anthropologists have questioned the assumption of economic
rationality or other grand theories of human nature since "man is so entangled with where
he is, who he is, and what he believes" that there is no one "human nature" independent
of time, place, and cultural context (Geertz 1973: 35). This human constructed culture is
what enables communities to do what Hardin's theoretical pastoralists could not do: adapt
their behaviors to changing environmental, economic, and social conditions by creating
management institutions. Indeed, this is what makes humans human, our ability to
conceive the changing world around us and consciously manipulate our relationship with
it (McEvoy 1986). Experimental research on individuals' motivations to cooperate has
revealed that individuals may not always act just in their own self-interest (Ostrom 1998).
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It is important to note that most critiques of the rational choice paradigm are

devoted to debunking some of the assumptions ofthe theory and has done little to refute
its empirical validity (Ostrom 2001). Such critiques have also tended to over-state the
assumptions of rational choice, not taking into account the inherent flexibility of this
often stereotyped perspective (Mueller 2003).
Besides critiquing the generalizability of rational choice theory and the often pure
private property rights advocacy of this perspective, much of the current CPR literature
also critiques pure state government management as environmentally, economically, and
socially inefficient when compared to more localized informal systems. Problems with
state ownership include the cultural and social distance between state managers and local
users, reliance on higher-tech engineering, and the need for non-local labor to monitor
and maintain the system (Ostrom 2001). As a result of these critiques, co-management
has emerged as one potential solution to CPR management dilemmas (Durrenberger and
King 2000).
Cole (2002) concludes that there is no one type of property rights system that is a
correct model for most contexts. With private property rights advocates, it is often
assumed that such rights effectively decrease externality such as pollution. Ifit is the
absence of property rights that explains pollution, then what explains the absence of
property rights? Thus, Cole arrives at the heart of the problem: what are the costs of
defining different forms of property rights? He concludes it is the economic, institutional,
technological, and ecological context that will determine the transaction costs of all forms
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of property rights systems and thus determine which type of rights are most appropriate
for the specific context.
The most recent CPR management literature agrees mostly with Cole's position,
expanding beyond property rights systems and noting that the wealth of case studies
collected on informal CPR management systems shows us that certain environmental,
social, and technological contexts allow for the creation and maintenance of diverse types
of informal CPR institutions (Burger, et. al. 200 1). Thus, such contexts need to be further
delineated in order to better understand under what conditions informal CPR
management institutions work or fail (Burger, et. al. 2001).

2.3: Creation, Maintenance, and Adaptation of Local Management Systems
The previous section briefly summarized rational choice theory that shaped the
origins of what has become CPR management theory and the ensuing critiques of this
paradigm that have led to increasingly complex theoretical models of CPR analysis. This
section briefly summarizes three emerging complex themes in the CPR management
literature. Section 2.3.1 outlines the pieces of the 'CPR Puzzle', the basic framework of
requirements in managing a CPR. This compares costs and benefits between informal and
formal CPR management systems regarding creating, maintaining, and changing rules.
This 'CPR Puzzle' encompasses a major theoretical breakthrough of the recent CPR
literature, that CPR management institutions are not static and subject to modification
and change. Section 2.3.2 introduces two models outlining design principles of CPR
management that have been shown effective in numerous case studies. These models are
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the basis for the first research question of this paper. Section 2.3.3 expands upon the
theoretical development of management as a dynamic variable. This section is the basis
of analysis regarding the second research question and introduces the concept of
'resiliency' .

2.3.1: The CPR Puzzle
Ultimately, management of ePRs through informal institutions requires two main
accomplishments: limiting access (closed access conditions, deciding who will be
excluded and how) and limiting harvest (because the taking by one user will affect the
takings of another) (Burger, et. al. 2001).
So why are informal systems sometimes preferable to formal systems? It is
important to briefly contrast perceived costs and benefits of formal vs. informal systems
to better understand why one community may develop and maintain one system and
another might choose a different approach. Holling (1986) shows that CPR choices can
occur when management systems are vulnerable or under stress.
There are three types of transaction costs to consider when choosing between
formal or informal CPR management systems. First, there are costs associated with
creating rules. Second, there are costs associated with enforcing rules. With legal

property rights systems, sanctioning relies on the judicial system and can exhibit high
transaction costs. Libecap (1978) argues that operating through the 'due process oflaw'
contributes to low efficiency in the courts and creates high time and money costs. By
contrast, informal property rights systems usually involve coordination games between
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users, and rules are agreed upon through some form of explicit or implicit voting
procedures. Mueller (2003) provides a thorough overview of types of voting procedures.
These agreed upon rules include monitoring and sanctioning to oversee and punish users
that are rulebreakers or free-riders. In order for informal systems to be more attractive,
they need to have low individual transactions costs for monitoring and sanctioning these
rulebreakers. In a context where users have the option of choosing between formal and
informal systems, the system with lower transaction costs for monitoring and sanctioning
is usually more advantageous.
Third, there are also transaction costs to consider in both types of systems when
users attempt to change these rules. Transaction costs can be high in both types of
systems, but changing rules presents a different set of characteristics in each. Transaction
costs to change rules tend to be higher in informal systems because, unlike in formal
systems where the rules are written, a user has to prove a rule actually exists. Rules in
informal systems exist not on paper, but in human behavior. To change human behavior
is usually more costly and a more difficult venture than to change written law.

2.3.2: Principles ofSuccess
There are several models in the CPR literature that discuss the institutional
characteristics and context associated with successful CPR folk management systems
(Ostrom 1990, Baland and Platteau 1996). These models examine the informal
management institutions that have been successfully transferred across generations of
CPR users in a large number of local case studies. These successful folk management
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systems are also credited with maintaining and enhancing local environmental, economic,
and social health.
The best-known work on local CPR management comes from Elinor Ostrom
(2001, Dolsak and Ostrom 2003). Ostrom's model identifies seven 'principles' associated
with successful local CPR management systems. First, well-delineated and stable
boundaries around the resource are key since they reduce the transaction costs of
identifying potential incursions by those from outside the community (Dolsak and

.

Ostrom 2003, Ostrom 2001). Such boundaries help to alleviate potential 'tragedies' of
pure open-access. Second, there must be congruence among key elements. Initially, the
distribution of benefits and costs upon each individual user from rules must be roughly
perceived as fair and equitable, as well as be fair and equitable in practice. Also, such
appropriation rules assigning benefits and costs to individual users must be adapted to
specific local conditions (Ostrom 2001). Thus, rules must be congruent to and coincide
with real and perceived equity and unique local conditions. The third design principle
involves collective-choice arrangements that define an oversight process whereby
appropriators can change the rules if needed. If the voice and interests of these
appropriators are not heard, then they may 'exit' or perhaps will even begin to cheat the
rules and norms of the community causing rises in enforcement costs and potential
breakdown of the management system (Hirschman 1970). Lack of input from all users
decreases transfer of information among users and can endanger community management
institutions by causing stagnation and slower responses to change (Ostrom 2001).
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The fourth and fifth principles reflect the presence of effective monitoring and
the use of graduated sanctions to make sure rulebreakers are caught and that
punishment is appropriate and at least pervasive enough in order to promote rule
compliance and even increase self-monitoring. If rulebreakers are not properly monitored
(and this comes to the attention of many in the community) conflict-resolution
mechanisms can breakdown because the cost of enforcing rules increases. Sixth,
successful management systems must have efficient and effective conflict-resolution
mechanisms. Transaction costs must be low for conflict-resolution. Finally, it is
important that local, regional and state governments recognize the informal, unwritten
management practices. The more legal recognition is given to informal management
institutions, the less likely future disputes over state vs. common / private property and
access to such CPRs will be challenged judicially (Ostrom 2001).
The lack of anyone of these seven crucial principles (see Table 2) can cause a
breakdown in the management system that can then be the catalyst for fundamental
change (Holling 1986).
Ostrom's model does contain an eighth design principle, 'nested enterprises' that I
do not include here because this is applicable to CPRs that are managed across analytical
levels. This principle is applicable to an emerging area of theorizing in the CPR literature,
that of overlapping or nested commons across temporal and spatial scales. Global
commons such as air and ocean pollution are distinguishable from other singular level
CPR management systems in that management institutions that can and are affected by
the problem exist across local, regional, and or national levels (Burger et. al. 2001).
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Table 2. Design Principles Illustrated by Long-Enduring CPR Institutions.

1. Clearly defined boundaries.
Individuals or households who have rights to withdraw resource units from the
CPR must be clearly defined, as must the boundaries of the CPR itself.

2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions.
Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and / or quantity of
resource units are related to local conditions and to provision rules requiring
labor, material, and / or money.
3. Collective-choice arrangements.
Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying
the operational rules.
4. Monitoring.
Monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator behavior, are
accountable to the appropriators or are the appropriators.
5. Graduated sanctions.
Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be assessed graduated
sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offense) by other
appropriators, by officials accountable to those appropriators, or by both.

6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms.
Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to
resolve conflicts among appropriators or between appropriators and officials.
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize.
The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not challenged by
external government authorities.
Adapted from (Ostrom 1990: 90).

Baland and Platteau (1996) offer a second model that succinctly summarizes other
CPR models, including Ostrom's, while adding a few principles of their own (see Table
3). In addition to Ostrom's seven factors, they add:
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1. Low costs of exclusion technology
2. High physical overlap between the CPR and users' residences
3. High demands for the resource
4. High user knowledge of sustainable yields
5. Small size of user group
6. High mutual obligation and concern for social reputation between users
The principles from these two models can be divided into three main categories.
Ostrom's model includes two principles that concern the physicaL environment
characteristics of the CPR (principles #1 and #2) and the five other principles outline
what forms of institutional arrangements affect successful CPR management. Baland and
Platteau incorporate six of these seven principles, one physical and all of the management
institutional, into their model. They add a third category of factors, characteristics of the
user group that extend Ostrom's model.
The main disagreements between the two models concern the effects of user
group 'size' and the importance of other social and cultural attributes of user groups.
While Baland and Platteau argue size and CPR success are negatively correlated, Ostrom
concludes that the data on how size and heterogeneity of users affect collective action is
inconclusive (Ostrom 2001). Most of the classics on collective action through the 1960s
to 1970s adopt the rational choice perspective and logically concluded that the larger a
group of maximizing individuals, the less likely collective action will succeed as shown
by repeated game theories (Buchanan and Tullock 1962). However, examples drawn
from irrigation CPR settings provide evidence to the contrary. Tang (1992) and Lam
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Table 3. Factors influencing the likelihood of successful collective action.
1. The resources. The smaller and more clearly defined the boundaries ofthe
common-pool resources, the greater the chance of success. (Ostrom #1)

2. The technology. The lower the costs of exclusion technology (such as fencing)
the better the chances of success.
3. Relationship between resources and user group.
a. Location: the greater the overlap between the location of the commonpool resources and the residence of the users, the better chance of success
b. Users' demands: the greater the demands (up to a limit) and the more
vital the resource for survival, the greater the chances of success
c. Users' knowledge: the better their knowledge of sustainable yields, the
greater the chances of success
4. User group characteristics.
a. Size: the smaller the number of users the better the chances of success,
down to a minimum below which the tasks able to be performed by such
a small group cease to be meaningful (perhaps because, for reasons to do
with the nature of the resource, action to mitigate common property
problems must be done, if at all, by a larger group). (data inconclusive)
b. Boundaries: the more clearly defined are the boundaries of the group, the
better the chance of success (similar to Ostrom #1)
c. Relative power of sub-groups: the more powerful are those who benefit
from retaining the commons, and the weaker are those who favor subgroup enclosure or private property, the better the chance of success
(similar to Ostrom #3)
d. Existing arrangements for discussion of common problems: the better
developed are such arrangements among the users, the greater the
chances of success (matches Ostrom #6)
e. Extent to which users are bound by mutual obligations: the more
concerned people are about social reputation, the better chance of success
f.

Punishments against rule-breaking: the more the users already have joint
rules for purposes other than common-pool resource use, and the more
bite behind those rules, the better the chances of success (Ostrom #5)

5. Noticeability. Ease of detection of rule-breaking free-riders: the more
noticeable is cheating on agreements, the better the chances of success.
Noticeability is also a function partly of 1, 3a, and 4a. (similar to Ostrom #4)
6. Relationship between users and state. Ability of state to penetrate rural
localities, and tolerance oflocally based authorities: the less the state can, or
wishes to, undermine locally based authorities, and the less the state can enforce
private property rights effectively, the better chance of success. (Ostrom #7)
Adapted from (Baland and Platteau 1996: 286-288).

29
(1998) both show that the smallest groups they studied (with only a handful of users) did
not perform better on any of a series of environmental and economic performance
measures compared to their largest groups (which ranged from 300 to 475 members). It is
crucial when analyzing size to understand 'jointness of supply', whether or not the costs
of providing a public good remain stable with an increase in numbers of users. With such
varying examples on size, it is most accurate at this point in the debate to say that size has
a curvilinear relationship to success (Ostrom 2001). Homogeneity and size are often

.

related in the CPR management literature as many theorists often see a positive
relationship between size and heterogeneity (Ostrom 2001). Homogeneity is often
measured by user similarity across four main variables: assets, skills, discount rates, and
cultural views / attitudes (Ostrom 2001).
For the purposes of empirically testing these models against Latin American case
studies as outlined in my first of two research questions for this paper, I have combined
these two models into one overall set of principles theorized to account for CPR
management success (see Table 4). This synthesis includes all seven of Ostrom's
principles as well as three additional principles from Baland and Platteau (excluding
'costs of exclusion technology', 'physical overlap between the CPR and users'
residences', and 'size') for a total often principles. 'Costs of exclusion technology' is
discounted since the case studies I will be analyzing in chapter IV do not exhibit forms of
exclusion technology. Rather, exclusion of outsiders is based on monitoring and
sanctioning mechanisms already covered by Ostrom's model. 'Exclusion technology' is
more applicable to CPR resources such as rangelands where physical exclusion markers
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such as fences are present, whereas in fisheries such physical markers are often not.
'Physical overlap' is discounted along similar grounds as 'exclusion technology'. This
factor is more applicable to other types of CPR resources such as rangelands and forests
where users' residences can and sometimes do exist on the CPR itself. In such cases
'overlap' can be measured, but in fisheries, users' residences do not exist physically on
the waters, they do not overlap the CPR. 'Size' is discounted for reasons mentioned
previously.
Table 4 presents the combined model I will be testing in c}1apter v. It includes
principles from the three categories across both models. The first two principles are
concerned with physical environment characteristics. Principles #2 through #7 are
concerned with management institution arrangements. Principles #8 through #10 are from
Baland and Platteau. These three are not 'design principles' or rule arrangements like the
previous six factors that seek to control human behavior or are part of the institutional
structure of CPR management, but rather they are characteristics of the user group.
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Table 4. Model of Effective and Resilient CPR Management Principles.
l. Clearly defined boundaries. Individuals or households who have rights to
withdraw resource units from the CPR must be clearly defined, as must the
boundaries of the CPR itself.
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions.
Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and / or quantity of resource
units are related to local conditions and to provision rules requiring labor, material,
and / or money.
3. Collective-choice arrangements. Most individuals affected by the operational rules
can participate in modifying the operational rules.
4. Monitoring. Monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator
behavior are accountable to the appropriators or are the appropriators.
5. Graduated sanctions. Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be
assessed graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the
offense) by other appropriators, officials accountable to those appropriators, or both.
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms. Appropriators and their officials have rapid
access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts among appropriators or between
appropriators and officials.
7. State tolerance of local management systems. The rights of appropriators to devise
their own management institutions are not challenged by external authorities.
8. Users' demands for the resource. Demands must be high (up to a limit) and the
resource needs to be seen as vital for survival.
9. User knowledge of sustainable yields. Users' knowledge of sustainable yields
needs to be high.
lO. Mutual obligation and concern for social reputation between users. The extent
to which users are bound by mutual obligations and their concern about their social
reputation need to be high.
Adapted from (Ostrom 1990:90; Baland and Platteau 1996:286-288).
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2.3.3: Resilience to Change
In his classic work on human environmental adaptation, Holling (1986) theorizes
that fundamental changes in natural resource management institutions can only occur at
points of deep crisis in the environmental and social systems when the accumulation of
perceived failures in those systems exceed the perceived benefits of the management
institutions. It is this sort of fundamental change that can be equated with a complete
breakdown in traditional management systems that have existed informally in small-scale
communities for generations. Changes that were unforeseen by lo.cals, such as the
commercial fishery encroachment explained above, can cause the breakdown of informal
CPR management systems. With a growing number of such examples of management
system breakdown in recent years, an emerging theme in the CPR literature has been an
evaluation of the resiliency oflocal management institutions to forces of change.
'Resilience' generally refers to the magnitude of disturbance a system can absorb
before it fundamentally changes or breaks down (Berkes and Folke 1998). Resilience has
been applied in the natural resource management literature by examining the dynamic
feedback mechanisms and changes between social and ecological systems (Gunderson et.
al. 1995, Gunderson and Holling 2002). Applied to informal folk CPR management,
'resilience' is the capacity of that management system to absorb disturbances while
maintaining its traditional behavioral processes and structure (Berkes et. al. 2003).
For most authors, management is itself a variable (a part of the social system)
subject to fundamental breakdown or change. Local user groups that can effectively
develop particular adaptive responses to external disturbances are those that can promote
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resiliency in their management system and maintain their unwritten laws. The
development of appropriate adaptive responses depends on context. The main factors that
most often influence such effective adaptive responses are: high user group reciprocity,
rapid and inclusive collective action mechanisms, and effective management institution
learning mechanisms. Institutional learning involves a continual commitment by users to
gather and analyze data, whether by observational or more formally scientific means, in
order to keep aware of changes and trends in the environmental and social systems that
constitute the CPR system (such as integrating feedback from the. ecological and social
systems into management decision-making). Incorporating such observations in
management discussions and operations is one major key to effective adaptive response
(Berkes et. al. 2003). These three factors are highly inter-dependent.
The development of specific adaptive responses to change promotes flexibility on
the part of the local users, but also enhances the long-term resiliency and maintenance of
traditional informal management institutions themselves. The case studies presented in
chapter IV provide evidence of the adaptive and flexible responses of artisanal fishing
communities in Latin America in the face of external pressures.
Management institutions that are resilient to change over time through contextappropriate adaptations are the ones that are likely to promote environmental, economic,
and social health for present and future generations (Durrenberger and King 2000, Dolsak
and Ostrom 2003). Whatever types of property rights and rules an informal CPR
management system exhibits, it is change over time that tests the strength and determines
the resilience and stability of any unwritten law.
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CHAPTER III
FISHERIES

The previous chapter outlined the 'nature' of the fishery as a CPR that is often
times under certain types of management control and institutional design. This chapter
outlines the numerous 'problems' specific to fisheries of all types, shows how those
problems are inter-connected, and focuses on problems unique to third world artisanal

.

fisheries. There are four sections in this chapter. Section 3.1 briefly distinguishes between
the types of fisheries and fishing fleets across environmental, economic, and social
variables. Section 3.2 summarizes a set of emerging and inter-linked trends and threats
across all these types of fisheries. Section 3.3 provides an outline of the unique
challenges faced by third world artisanal fishing communities. This section also specifies
how these challenges affect small-scale fishery management institutions. Section 3.4
briefly restates the goals of the paper and relates the research questions to the specific
discussions on fishery challenges and fishery management.

3.1: Types of Fisheries
Social and Economic Subsectors
The fishing industry is distinguished mainly by technology and ownership.
Commercial fleets are typically harbor-landing and motorized. Commercial fleets also
tend to be owned by non-operator investors, which can be public (Sabella 1980) or
private (Sutherland 1986). In the commercial sector, high costs of entry and maintenance
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on more advanced and modernized forms of technology most often results in the owners
being distant investors, private companies, and others that are not directly the fishers
themselves.
A sub-category of the commercial sector is the 'ultra-modem' sector (Kurien
1978). The ultra-modem sector constitutes one extreme end on a spectrum of types of
fisheries, and is characterized by five factors (Platteau 1989a, Finlayson and McCay
1998):
•

The use of sophisticated modem technologies of boat range and exploitation
capacities that allow for international water traversing and intense fish catches
often with giant trawler nets

•

The employment of trained crews whose specialized qualifications and longjourney work patterns are far removed from the more generalized and closeto-shore fishing of small-scale fishers

•

Orientation toward the demands of more urbanized markets and foreign
consumers / investors, with few sales to the local community which often
leads to 'catch and run' behavior

•

Greater emphasis on strict quality control procedures

•

Strong ties to modem processing plants

At the other end of the spectrum are small-scale fisheries. Small-scale includes
fisheries of a wide array of characteristics and sizes in different contexts. Two main
characteristics distinguish small-scale fishing fleets from commercial fleets. First, smallscale fleets generally consist of all beachlanding units. Second, small-scale fleet owners /
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proprietors are usually the fishers themselves (Platteau 1989a). This sector uses smaller
and less sophisticated technologies. The reliance on beachlanding is associated with the
use of traditional wood-dug and reed-sewn canoes and rafts though modem small-scale
fishers often add an outboard motor or implement new materials and designs
(McGoodwin 1990). Small-scale fisheries require less heavy infrastructure such as
anchoring and harboring facilities, boats can be decentralized and dispersed along a
coastal shoreline or community. Because of the relatively simple technology associated
with beachlanding boats, most owners are also operators. They art the local fishers
themselves.
A sub-category of small-scale is 'artisanal'. The main distinguishing characteristic
separating 'artisanal' as a sub-category of the small-scale sector is technology. 'Artisanal'
fishers are non-motorized and typically do not purchase or use fishing materials obtained
from outside the community. This is why they are 'artisanal', they rely on relatively
crude local materials to fabricate all their own fishing technology. This artform requires
tremendous skills, intuition, and experience to operate such self-crafted equipment
(McGoodwin 1990).
The continued growth of commercial encroachment has increased the number of
commercial and small-scale fishers working side-by-side in the same local and regional
waters and increased complex economic integration and linkages between the two
sectors. Most, if not all, fishers in this era of commercial encroachment are selling at least
a portion of their catch either by delivering to regional markets or selling to closer
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community markets that are linked to more distant markets and their price fluctuation
dynamics.
To summarize, small-scale fishing is distinguished as all owner-operated
beachlanding boats. The 'artisanal' fisheries are the non-motorized portion of the smallscale sector. The 'ultra-modem' and the 'artisanal' represent the two extreme ends of the
fishing sector spectrum on the basis of technologies and are usually associated with their
own unique economic and social organizational linkages and patterns. They constitute the
ideal types of the competing sectors when analyzing commercial.encroachment.
However, it is important to keep in mind that beyond the main distinguishing factors for
each of the four categories I have described, there are numerous examples of fishers in
the middle of the spectrum that overlap these categories.

Environmental Subsectors
Fisheries are also distinguished by the environmental nature of the fishery itself.
There are rather straight-forward terms such as 'maritime' and 'riverine' that describe the
physical ecosystem of a fishery (oceans and rivers, respectively). The most crucial and
often confused terms are 'in-shore' and 'off-shore' areas in maritime fisheries. For the
purposes of this paper, 'in-shore' waters are the coastal territories the majority of smallscale and / or artisanal fishers in a community exploit. These territories usually form a
stretch of coastline along the adjacent community shore, characterized by shallower water
depths (compared to 'off-shore' waters) and are therefore more conducive to exploitation
by fishers using low-technology crafts that are often too difficult to operate far from
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shore. 'Off-shore' waters are the territories more distant from shore most often used by
high-technology commercial fleets. Their technologies, such as trawler nets, are more
conducive to deep-water exploitation. Although the exact distance separating 'in-shore'
from 'off-shore' waters depends on the particular marine ecosystem, most often the two
can be distinguished by analyzing the limits to artisanal fleet distance from shore.
Commercial fleets often do enter and exploit these in-shore territories, which is an
increasing problem for small-scale fishing communities.

3.2: Trends and Threats
3.2.1: Collapse of Fisheries Worldwide
At the end of the twentieth century, there is an emerging set of environmental,
economic, and social problems that adversely affect all types of fisheries worldwide (see
Table 5). Environmentally, over-exploitation of fish stock may be occurring in the
context of exponential world population growth as measured by two factors: decreased
amount of catch per unit of fishing effort (decreased efficiency) and a decrease in the
world's per capita fish production (McGoodwin 1990, Fairlie 1995, Acheson et. al.
1998). Even though the total annual fish catch steadily increased from the 1850s to the
1960s, starting from 2 million tons growing to 55 million tons (with a doubling from 20
to 40 million tons in only ten years from 1950 to 1960), the rate of growth leveled off in
the 1970s (growing slightly from 66 million tons in 1971 to 72 million tons by 1980, a
pronounced decline in growth rate from 5 percent per year between 1945 and 1970 to
only 1 percent per year through the 1970s). A more recent increase to over 90 million
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tons by the end of the 1980s reflects accelerated fishing efforts and more intensive
harvest technology, mainly in the commercial sector (Platteau 1989a).

Table 5. Emerging Trends and Threats in Fisheries.
Commercial

Small-Scale

Environmental

Severe
• fish stock depletion
• species extinction

Severe
• fish stock depletion
(sometimes due to
spillover effects)
• species extinction

Economic

Moderate
• decrease in per capita
fish production
• profitability with rising
costs

Severe

•
•
•
•

Social

Low

decrease in per capita
fish production
decrease in efficiency
level of integration with
commercial
encroachment
tourism encroachment

Severe

•
•

•
•

•

community survival
mgmt. institutional
credibility
relations with
government
level of integration with
commercial
encroachment
tourism encroachment

The recent growth in fish harvests does not mean the amount of fish available for
harvest is increasing. Rather, advances in fishing technology (especially in the 1980s)
allowed commercial and motorized fleets to harvest a wider range of species previously
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unavailable at depths and places never before exploited in order to raise the overall
amount of the world's fish catch (McGoodwin 1990). An early 'take-off' point in this
technological advancement was when commercial fleets implemented technologies
developed during the industrial boom years of World War II. By the 1960s, inexpensive
steel construction, diesel engines, shipboard refrigeration and automated freezing,
electronics for more precision long-distance and night navigation, long-distance
communications, and bottom-imaging and fish-finding monitors all were available. This
produced new 'factory-freezer trawler' fleets that were equipped to fish around the clock,
over long distances, and able to sweep the oceans more efficiently with trawler nets while
gathering more fish with fewer transaction costs (Finlayson and McCay 1998).
However, this 'bonanza' period of trawlers sweeping the oceans clean soon grew
over-saturated, leading to a decline in efficiency and productivity in the 1970s. Also
affecting the growth of worldwide fish catch may have been the more stringent U.S.
policy acts of the 1970s that were enacted because of increasing concerns of ecological
limits and a fundamental reconceptualizing of the human-nature relationship by the
environmental movement. Policy such as the Marine Mammals Protection Act and the
Fishery Conservation and Management Act lessened the contribution of U.S. catch
amounts to worldwide totals over the last three decades (McEvoy 1986).
So while the total number has risen, the two key factors of catch per unit of
fishing effort (efficiency) and the world's per capita fish production have steadily
decreased. While commercial efficiency may be generally rising (F AO 2002, 2000),
small-scale efficiency seems to be declining (McGoodwin 1990, Brown 1978). In a study
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of various types and sizes of fishing fleets worldwide by the FAO through the mid-1990s,
an important finding was that the extreme low-technology end of the fishery spectrum
was one of the few sectors losing capital and efficiency. This was attributed mainly to
over-exploitation of fishery resources and competition from more efficient and
technologically sophisticated commercial capture technologies, such as purse seiners and
coastal trawlers (FAO 2000, FAO 1999, NOAA 1999, Stergiou 1989, Akpalu 2002).
The world's per capita fish production remained steady through the 1990s at
about 15 to 16 kg if China's recent boom in the last 20 years in b~th marine and
aquaculture production are accounted for (F AO 2002). However, when Chinese
production is excluded, per capita fish production appears to have steadily declined since
the 1980s from about 15 kg to 13 kg in 2001 (FAO 2002, FAO 2000). While the total fish
catch has continued to rise through the last decade to over 90 million tons, there is
concern that the rate of increase in total fish harvests will eventually drop to zero as it
reaches the ocean's maximum aggregate annual productivity level (estimated to be near
100 million tons) (McEvoy 1986).
This means there still may be a growing, stable, or decreasing absolute amount of
fish in the world's seas, but such a measure does not necessarily matter. The relative
amount offish per human has decreased with the exponential growth of the world
population since 1950. That, coupled with an increase in the number of fishers on the
seas has caused fisher efficiency to decrease (McEvoy 1986). While the debate continues
on whether or not the absolute number of fish available is growing or declining, such an
argument may be erroneous as fisher efficiency and per capita productivity are steadily
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decreasing, while growth in population and higher incomes have led to a rise in the
demand for fish (Platteau I 989a). It no longer appears that fish will be adequate to feed
the world's poor (Durrenberger and King 2000). These trends have also placed increased
pressure on commercial and small-scale fisheries seeking to meet demand in nearby
regional and urban markets.
Commercial fisheries also have seen an emerging problem of fish extinction and
fish 'undergrowth'. There has been extensive documentation of the near extinction of the
northern cod between the Labrador and the Grand Banks of Newfoundland where the use
of new technologies led to over-exploitation of a major commercial fishery (Finlayson
and McCay 1998, Finlayson 1994, Milich 1999, Haedrich and Hamilton 2000). The once
massive anchovy reserves offthe central coast of Peru were over-exploited to near
extinction in the mid-70s (Clark 1977). Salmon in the Pacific Northwest (Taylor 1999)
and whitefish in Canadian freshwater lakes (Handford et. al. 1977) have entered 'new
evolutionary paths' of 'undergrowth' resulting from the use of technologies such as largesweeping trawler nets with smaller and more firm netholes leading to selective harvest of
larger fish that allow only smaller fish to escape and reproduce. This 'undergrowth' has
been associated with a decrease in fisher efficiency, where a fisher can now catch the
same number of fish in such areas, but tonnage has decreased since the fish are
increasingly smaller (Russell 2003).
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3.2.2: Commercial Encroachment on Small-Scale Fishing Communities
While both commercial and small-scale fisheries share the problem offish stock
depletion, there are other economic and social problems that are unique to small-scale
fisheries. Many of these problems are heavily influenced by commercial fish fleet
competition and encroachment. One example is fish stock depletion that is often the
result of 'spillover' effects. 'Spillover' effects result from the fact that ocean waters are
an 'overlapping' natural resource where a wide array of user communities from different
regions and nations are connected by migrating fish stocks (Burger et. al. 200 1). This
'overlap of jurisdiction' not only makes the oceans and their connecting waterways a
CPR for management purposes, but also the ocean ecosystem itself is connected across
these jurisdictional boundaries as well. Thus, more commercial fishers catching fish or
even overexploiting a fish to extinction in one part of the ocean will have 'overlapping'
effects on nearby communities that also use that ocean. Northern cod overfishing does
not only affect Newfoundland, but surrounding regions fishing out of the Northern
Atlantic as well. Even inland riverine fishery stocks are often not safe and adversely
affected from over-exploitation in adjoining oceans (McEvoy 1986). Such environmental
problems are shared by all types of fisheries, including inland riverine fisheries connected
to the ocean ecosystem, and show the externalities of commercial technology and
harvesting methods. This creates an emerging problem for fisheries management as
institutional responses to such spillover problems will have to be coordinated between
institutions, between various user communities, and across scales of management (Burger
et. al. 200 1).
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A common explanation for decreases in efficiency and productivity emphasizes
the 'open-access' nature of ocean fisheries. 'Open-access' is a case of poorly defined
property rights where individuals or groups have access to extract units from a resource
without any fear of sanction or punishment because there is supposedly no management
system in place (Burger, et. al. 2001). However, this view ignores not only the
aforementioned advances in technology, but also the formal and informal management
institutions of small-scale fishing communities that often affect in-shore and off-shore
sectors of a local fishery (Finlayson and McCay 1998). Thus, the.reasons for overexploitation and loss of efficiency and productivity in fisheries can be conceptualized as
an institutional problem in the 'rules of the game', beyond a simple explanation of too
many people chasing too few fish (McEvoy 1986).
With some commercial fleets overexploiting fish stocks or losing efficiency,
many are searching for new territories on these 'open-access' seas to maintain or increase
their catches to satisfy markets and the demand for fish (McEvoy 1986). Commercial
encroachment is a major emerging problem in small-scale fisheries (McGoodwin 1990,
Finlayson and McCay 1998). With establishments ofexc1usive economic zones (EEZs)
under the authorities granted by the United Nation's Law of the Sea (signed by most
nations in 1982, with the notable exception of the U.S.), numerous third world coastal
nations are encouraging distant-water fleets to exploit their maritime resources for the
potential economic gains associated with increases in foreign investment and export sales
(Platteau 1989a, Royce 1987). With such legal encouragement for outside commercial
encroachment facilitated by the state, small-scale fisheries are increasingly vulnerable to
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not only national commercial fleets, but also an increasing body of international
commercial fleets. This can destabilize local and regional markets by suddenly
incorporating the small-scale fishery into a larger globalized fish trade market. This often
creates forward linkages, but little to no backward linkages. It also potentially places the
community in a dependent relationship within globalized north-south fish trade markets,
supplying the first world with fish for relatively low prices in return. Such encroachment
continues to push vulnerable small-scale fishers to more specialization and
marginalization in order to compete in certain regions (McCully 1991).

It is important to note that there is not always such a stark contrast of two types of
fleets competing side-by-side. Rather, in some cases economic and social absorption and
incorporation can occur. Small-scale fishers may be hired to work as crew on the growing
commercial fleets, they may collaborate with commercial fleets by acting as 'ferries'
transporting crews and catches to and from shore with commercial fleets that are too
large or lack docking facilities, and they may gain access to commercially important
processing and service facilities and manufactured inputs that exist on shore (Platteau
I 989a).

Even when encroachment on small-scale fishers has produced some positive
benefits, there still exist problems of increasing inequality, outsider community control,
and a possible increase in the peripheral status of the community within a larger
economic market. McCully (1991) suggests that there is an emerging 'technological
dualism' between commercial and small-scale fishers. Higher costs of production for
catching fish and the introduction of highly exploitative technology' such as giant trawler
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nets in the last half century has only benefited large commercial fleets with access to
more capital, technology, and political power than peripheral small-scale fishers. Thus, a
rise in non-worker fleet owners and small-scale dependence on merchant financiers has
emerged.

3.2.3: Emerging Problems in Third World Fisheries
In the third world, including Latin America, there are unique problems associated
with small-scale fisheries. Historically low levels of economic deNelopment and
persistent drains on national budgets from external debt makes funding regional fishery
councils for licensing, issuing and monitoring quotas, and sanctioning rulebreakers very
difficult (Cordell 1984). Many developed nations (such as the U.S.) fund regional
councils for such management purposes, because they have enough capital to do so.
Meanwhile, in the third world many local communities are left to themselves to somehow
perform the costly functions of controlling open-access, limiting technological growth,
and stopping or regulating commercial encroachment. This unique third world problem
can sometimes generate successful collective action as communities left to their own
devices seek to control technologically-advanced and well-funded fleets entering their
waters. Rather than focusing all of their limited resources on community fishery
management and having a state-financed body that regulates and is more connected to
external fishing fleets, third world fishers often have to manage and adapt to these
external threats by themselves shifting time and energy away from fishing effort and
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internal fishery management (such as concentrating on monitoring and sanctioning
rulebreakers).
Internal conflict between community users themselves can also arise for a variety
of reasons. Rather unique to certain third world and Latin American communities is
growth in inequality of fish catch between two or more groups that each have exclusive
access and / or expertise in differing forms of exploitive technology, such as net building
materials (Seixas and Berkes 2003). In certain isolated periphery communities that
exhibit stable or dwindling traditional populations because of cOniinued out-migration,
fish stocks can not only stabilize but also increase and produce greater inequalities among
community fishers due to differences in access and expertise in various exploitive
technologies. Such small communities may find successful collective action difficult
even though their fishery resource is quite abundant.
An additional problem specific to third world and Latin American fisheries is
tourism encroachment. There is an emerging literature that attempts to understand how
tourism is either destroying, integrating, or marginalizing local third world peasants'
economic livelihoods. Although this topic is beyond the scope of this paper, it is
important to note that tourism encroachment is significant in many Latin American smallscale fishing communities that exhibit high-amenity values (Seixas and Berkes 2003).
Tourist amenities such as adequate waves for surfing, attractive shoreline landscapes, and
stable mild temperatures make a community an attractive tourist destination for many
first world vacationers (Balagna 2002).
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3.3: Unique Challenges of Fisheries Management
The purpose of this section is to review the ecological factors and organization of
work / labor that present unique challenges for fisheries management. The focus is on the
characteristics common to fisheries of all types with consideration for how each of these
characteristics operates within small-scale and artisanal fisheries. Often, how a
characteristic operates in a fishery will be compared to how a similar characteristic
operates in other natural resource sectors (agriculture, forestry, rangeland pastoralism) in
order to highlight the unique nature of fisheries. These characteristics need to be taken
into account when analyzing fishery communities and their respective management
systems as they all can influence management creation, maintenance, and outcomes
(Pollnac 1991, Acheson 1981, McGoodwin 2001).
The fisheries development literature provides information about the range of
variables that define the challenges of fisheries management. These are summarized in
Table 6 below. In their work on fisheries development projects, Pollnac (1991) and
McGoodwin (2001) specifically account for the uniqueness of fisheries and the social
variables that affect the success or failure of 'participatory' projects. Their conclusions
are based on direct development field experiences and have been observed as occurring
across fisheries of certain types. Acheson (1981) has also noted how fishers face
distinctive risks and uncertainties and exhibit an organization of livelihood unique to their
profession that must be accounted for when analyzing fishery communities' management
systems. These characteristics paint a more specific picture about what is most crucial in
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building a theory of fishery management beyond the large literature on CPR
management.
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Table 6. Unique Challenges of Fisheries.
Category

Commercial

Small-Scale

Artisanal

Fishing is Inherently
Unpredictable

High

High

High

Featurelessness of Open
Waters

High (maritime)

High (maritime)

High (maritime)

High Rate of
Perishability of Product

Moderate
• storage
facilities
allow for
storage
beyond a few
days I weeks
for shipment

Severe
• dependent on
access to
refrigeration
and icepacking

Severe
• no refrigeration
ice used rarely
• often leads to
economIC
peripheralization

•

Ecological Factors

Organization of Work I Labor
Irregular Work Hours

High

High

High

Shifting Residence
Patterns

Moderate

High

High

Occupational Pluralism

High

High

High

Natural Resource Use I
Subsistence Pluralism

Low I None
• often not
community
residents with
access to land
or squatter
land
• sea-gomg
vessel crew

High

High
• often subsistence
users in dire
need of
supplements
• access to
adjacent land,
often informally
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3.3.1: Ecological Factors
Fishing is Inherently Unpredictable
There are three ways in which all types of fishing waters (maritime, riverine, etc.)
across all types of fishery sectors (commercial to small-scale) are unpredictable. Those
are: rapid tide and waterflow shifts due to weather change, the extracted units (sea, river,
and lake creatures such as fish, plankton, etc.) are highly mobile, and these units are not
easily seen (Pollnac 1991, Acheson 1981). These three unpredictabilities influence a
fourth, the volatile nature of fishery production (McGoodwin 200l). All types of fisheries
are vulnerable to extreme seasonal production fluctuations influenced by unpredictable
weather patterns that often cause hard-to-track fish to suddenly shift location (Clark
1976, Cushing 1977).
In some cases, these four unpredictabilities do become more predictable over time
as fishers continually adapt and become more experienced with a body of water.
Knowledge passed down generations provides some means to reduce uncertainty
(Acheson 1981). Increased predictability largely depends on whether tide / waterflow
shifts and thus production occur in long-term 'seasonal' cycles or if these cycles shift
more frequently on a day-to-day or week-to-week basis (McGoodwin 2001). The most
predictable resources are those where there is a relatively long time period of resource
stability with seasonal shifts that occur with some regularity.
The unpredictable nature of fisheries ecology can influence the types of and
evolution of CPR management institutions (McGoodwin 200 I). In order to be resilient,
management institutions need to be flexible and allow the re-allocation of fishing
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territories (if specific territories are used by specific fishers) when seasonal shifts cause a
decrease in particular fishing spots or the entire fishery managed by a community
(Acheson 1981). In cases where specific territories suddenly decrease in production,
management institutional mechanisms for redistribution of catch or territorial allotment
that are perceived as inclusive and fair by fishers can ease the impacts of such drastic
changes in the fish stock (Pollnac 1991). In cases where an entire community fishery
witnesses a drop in production, management institutional mechanisms for maintaining
local/regional market linkages and 'middle-men' that are often a main source of income
for small-scale fishers can prepare for such downshifts by surplusing, increasing the
resilience of the system (Acheson 1981).

Featurelessness a/Open Waters
The 'featurelessness' of open water hinders dividing the resource into specific
parcels for the sake of privatizing property rights or fishing territories (McEvoy 1986).
With other natural resources and ePRs parceling is easier since forests, rangelands, and
croplands are land-based often having stable boundary-markers that can be securely
allocated (Smith 1977). The unpredictabilities of specific fishing spots further hinder
boundary maintenance efforts among community fishers (Pollnac 1991). With fisheries
then, the transaction costs of allocating and enforcing private property rights can often be
the highest of any natural resource (Acheson 1981, Smith 1977). This characteristic is
most severe in maritime fisheries where the 'openness' and 'featurelessness' of the open
sea is so vast that specific fishing territories can only be marked by "'visual triangulation'
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(Pollnac 1991, Forman 1970). This process of 'visual triangulation' of boundary-marking
private property rights, sea-tenure, and other forms of fishers rights to specific fishing
territories is most often done on the basis of two visual features: shoreline markers and
distance from shore (Chapman 2003, Sutherland 1986). These features serve as a visual
guidepost to fishers while out on the waters and enable them to familiarize themselves
enough with specific territory markers in order to more effectively place nets and gear
within their area. When the community group of fishers recognizes this visual
information, conflict decreases as each one understands where

th~y

are supposed to be

fishing.
An obvious connection between featurelessness and management institutions is
Ostrom principle #1, having clearly defined boundaries (see Table 2). In most successful
case studies, boundaries of the community and / or particular user group's CPR needs to
be clearly defined and understood by all users in order to effectively operate within the
CPR itself and in order to effectively defend and maintain the CPR against outsider
encroachment (Ostrom 1990). The featurelessness of the resource also influences
informal management institutions by often requiring strict monitoring and sanctioning
mechanisms (see Table 2, principles #4 and #5) in order to maintain private fishing
territories (when they exist) and also to effectively socially sanction 'free-riders' who
access territories that are not their own.
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High Rate of Perishability of Product
Unlike other natural resource sectors (e.g. most agricultural crops, livestock, and
timber), most fish and sea creatures are quite perishable once harvested (Acheson 1981).
As a result, the commercial fishery sector has extensive capital investments in higher-end
technologies such as refrigeration and dense ice-packing facilities on-shore, and many
times these facilities exist on the boat itself (Acheson 1981). By contrast, the small-scale
and artisanal sectors most often do not own or have access to refrigeration, with a few
utilizing on-shore or small in-raft ice (McGoodwin 2001). With either method, the
degeneration and loss of fish harvest can be significant (Pollnac 1991, Leap 1977).
The lack of storage facilities forces artisanal fishers to sell their catch on a daily
basis at local and regional markets (Noff 1975). This is also one reason why fish harvest
losses are relatively high compared to agriculture, pastoralism, and forestry. If the harvest
is not immediately sold or consumed by the artisanal fishers or their families, then it
quickly becomes commercially worthless. Thus, small-scale and artisanal fishers are
often in a position of dependency on local and adjacent regional markets. This further
hinders artisanal fishers from participating in regional, national, and international
markets.

3.3.2: Organization of Work I Labor
Irregular Work Hours
Since fish stocks are highly unpredictable due to ecological factors such as
weather and tide shifts, fishers in all types of fisheries are often forced to fish during 'off-
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hours' very early in the morning or overnight while most other people in their
communities are sleeping (White 1977). This is in contrast to small-scale agriculturalists
that can often operate on a more set daily schedule since their harvested unit is set in the
ground and immobile (though weather events can disrupt planting and harvests).
Artisanal fishers are especially prone to working in the 'off-hours' since their
rudimentary boats are vulnerable to being water-logged, tipping over, or breaking down
during high tides. Thus, safety is one reason why artisanal fishers in Huanchaco, Peru
often fish during the lowest tides occurring overnight (Chapman 2003). In Huanchaco,
fishers that do go out on the open sea during mid-day at high tide most often go in pairs
(two reed boats side by side) in order to fish and have a human 'safety net'. Maritime
artisanal fishers often work during such 'off-hours' overnight because sometimes lower
tides occur then and because these low tide (calmer water) periods are the most stable and
productive periods to catch fish (Royce 1987). Working at such odd hours, along with
residing on often isolated and narrow shorelines geographically separated from the rest of
the community (a point expanded upon later) have resulted in artisanal fishers being
social outcasts in many communities (Pollnac 1991, Acheson 1981, McGoodwin 1990).

Sh~fting

Residence Patterns

Another adaptive response to ecological variability is shifting residence patterns
(Acheson 1981). Periodicity in the availability of desired species and the highly mobile
and often unpredictable nature of fish migration often forces artisanal fishers to migrate
with their fish. They might do this by either moving to a family members' or
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acquaintances' residence nearer the desired catch or even living temporarily on their craft
(Pollnac 1991). This temporary, seasonal, and sometimes unpredictable shifting of
residence place and type is a characteristic of many small-scale and artisanal fishers
(Acheson 1981, McGoodwin 2001), and makes artisanal fishers more comparable to
pastoralists than agriculturalists (Pollnac 1991).
Seasonal shifts in residence presents problems for informal management. The
boundary definitions, inclusiveness, and collective decision-making processes that are
crucial in maintaining informal management institutions can be

w~akened

unless properly

accounted for by the users themselves (McGoodwin 2001). When such shifts are more
predictable and regularly seasonal in nature, then inclusive collective action is less costly
as fishers can migrate together or can be contacted regarding management of a certain
part of the fishery. Ifmigration is not only seasonally predictable, but also geographically
predictable (i.e., fishers migrate seasonally to the same territories), this further lessens
costs of management.

Occupational Pluralism
Since small-scale and even commercial fishing often bring in relatively small
incomes, many fishers supplement their meager fishing income with other work,
engaging in 'occupational pluralism' (Finlayson and McCay 1998). While some find
work in natural resource extraction jobs (forestry, mining) or other jobs available within
the community (McGoodwin 2001), such second and third jobs can often require longdistance migration to urban centers or other manual labor work such-as highway
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construction. Many fishers do it despite the often heavy costs involved with long-distance
migration (Acheson 1981). This is a characteristic not necessarily unique to fisheries as
subsistence agriculturalists and pastoralists, along with forestry employees also engage in
multiple occupations to supplement meager income from their primary natural resource
work (Leap 1977). However, it is important to understand this characteristic in the
specific context of fisheries, especially as it relates to natural resource use pluralism.

Natural Resource Use / Subsistence Pluralism
A characteristic of many small-scale and artisanal fishers is not only occupational
pluralism, but also natural resource use pluralism (Acheson 1981). This is when fishers
supplement their fishing income by also engaging in small-scale agriculture, animal
grazing for meat and wool products (pastoralism), gardening, wood gathering, and / or
hunting (McGoodwin 2001, Leap 1977). Such natural resource use can also be
considered 'work' and falls under the previous category of 'occupational pluralism' since
these activities often generate supplemental income. They require the same amount of
time (if not more) than primary fishing activities and they can sometimes require
temporary or seasonal residence shifts (Leap 1977).
Although occupational pluralism is a characteristic among all fishery sectors from
the commercial to the small-scale, natural resource use pluralism is unique to the smallscale and artisanal sectors (McGoodwin 200 I). This is often because commercial fishers
may not have a permanent residence in the community (they tend more to be migrant
workers or working on a long-distance commercial fishing craft in waters quite distant
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from their permanent residence) and therefore do not have access to the necessary land
for supplemental agricultural or grazing activities (McGoodwin 1990). Also, commercial
crew fishers receive a monetary income and often benefit packages from the vessel owner
(whether a public or private entity), while small-scale and artisanal fishers tend to rely
solely on natural resources for subsistence and / or income (Acheson 1981).
Natural resource use pluralism influences previously mentioned shifting residence
patterns. Where a maritime artisanal fisher resides during certain periods throughout the
year often depends on two main factors: how productive nearby cpastal and inland lands
are in regards to agriculture or grazing and during what times of the year fish catch peaks.
Thus, if inland land is available and at all conducive to agriculture or grazing, maritime
artisanal fishers may reside inland in order to farm or graze during part of the year and
then shift residency to the coast during another season (Pollnac 1991). Coastal land is
often unproductive agriculturally. This is because of thin shorelines with high and rapid
inland slopes or coastal deserts too far from distant mountains, both of which hinder
access to water runoff for irrigation. This creates unique problems for maintaining
informal management institutions in temporary fishing settlements because many
fishermen migrate to the coast or around the coast following sought after species without
their families or children (Pollnac 1991, Acheson 1981).
Historically, artisanal fishers have been social outcasts in many communities
since they often reside on these isolated and narrow shorelines geographically separate
from the rest of town while also working in the 'off-hours' (Pollnac 1991, Acheson 1981,
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McGoodwin 1990). In some cases, they are separated from the rest of the community by
both space and time.
The major factor affecting local informal management concerning occupational
and natural resource use pluralism is time spent by users on these supplementary
activities. Often with occupational pluralism, a local fisher leaves the community and
their residence for a stretch of time of weeks to months for another wage labor job.
Depending on how staggered local fishers are in their respective time spent outside their
communities relative to each other performing wage labor can adversely affect Ostrom's
principles #3, #4, and #5 (see Table 2). If there is a set season or fishing 'off-season' time
period where it is known throughout the user group that many local small-scale fishers
will be leaving the community for supplemental work or spending more time and energy
tending to other natural resource work while maintaining their residence, then this is
more annually predictable and management institutions are more likely to be adjusted
accordingly to account for seasonal loss of fishers. However, if such supplemental work
is staggered across the user group inconsistently, then a local fisher could experience less
access to collective-choice arrangements (such as status within the group or access to
voting or decision-making procedures). Also, if a local fisher leaves for supplemental
work that serves as a monitor or a locally respected official that is crucial in deciding and
administering sanctions, their access to such a position within an informal management
structure can be jeopardized.

60

3.4: Goals of the Paper
Chapter I introduced the importance of third world small-scale fisheries and
outlined the problems of these fisheries and how the research questions relate to those.
Chapter II reviewed the CPR management literature that explains how and what type of
informal institutions small-scale communities devise in order to manage a CPR. Chapter
III elaborated on the emerging problems facing small-scale fisheries and analyzed unique
challenges narrowing the discussion of CPR management down to small-scale and
artisanal fishery management. The next chapter presents seven case studies of small-scale
and artisanal fishing communities across the Latin American region taken from
previously published books and journal articles. Chapter V concludes with a synthesized
analysis of the case studies concerning the research questions. As originally presented in
chapter 1, my two research questions are:
1. Do the often cited Ostrom (1990) and Baland and Platteau (1996) models for

informal CPR management hold up in the case of Latin American fisheries?
2. What factors increase the resilience of local management systems in the face
of pressures from commercial encroachment in Latin American small-scale
fisheries?
The continued viability of informal fisheries management institutions in many
Latin American fishing communities are being threatened by outsider encroachment.
Thus, it is crucial to properly understand what principles promote effective management
and healthy CPRs (research question #1) and under what conditions these principles
continue to exist despite external threats (research question #2).
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CHAPTER IV
LA TIN AMERICAN ARTISANAL CASE STUDIES

This chapter outlines seven case studies from Latin American artisanal fishing
communities. Section 4.1 outlines three criteria most often used to classify artisanal
fisheries as being a 'success' or 'failure'. Section 4.2 provides descriptions of relevant
factors within each separate case study that have been previously defined and outlined.
Most of the data, being qualitative / ethnographically descriptive in nature and extracted
from the case studies, is included there.

4.1: Defining Success and Failure
In order to answer my first research question, I need to determine whether local
management systems 'work' or not in the context of Latin American artisanal fisheries.
To do this, I will first establish a set of criteria to distinguish between 'successful' and
'failed' artisanal fisheries. Much of the CPR management case study literature is
concerned with preparing policy recommendations for furthering effective natural
resource management practices. As a result, a majority of cases are defined at some point
as either 'succeeding' or 'failing' by various criteria determined either by the author,
previous researchers, or the local CPR users themselves.
However, there is little clear consensus about how to define success and failure of
a CPR. Numerous criteria ranging from formalized clusters of variables to more informal
observations of a few variables have been utilized. However, there are some regularities

62
among criteria that can be categorized. Three general categories that often serve as
criteria for determining success and failure are: environmental/ecosystem health,
economic performance, and social stability. Applying these criteria to artisanal fisheries,
success would be determined by:
•

Environmental Health: fish stock, species renewal, levels of

ecosystem degradation, levels of catch and production
•

Economic Performance: resource unit output, prices, income

levels
•

Social Stability: community isolation, cohesion, factioning,

splintering, inequality
Such measures provide a starting point to determine success and failure in a
fishery. In the case studies analyzed in this paper, these three criteria are sometimes
mentioned in passing and not necessarily supplemented with quantified data. Even in
such cases, the level of environmental, economic, and social health can be determined as
relatively a 'success' or 'failure' since most of the case study literature on artisanal
fishery failure paints a picture of those variables being in such dire conditions that
determining success relative to such deteriorating conditions can be achieved. Thus, the
case study literature on artisanal fisheries has tended to show success and failure on the
edges of a spectrum, with ecological and social systems either working quite smoothly or
nearing complete collapse.
For the first research question, success and failure will be determined by those
three criteria. I will then examine the existence of the ideal types of CPR management
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principles to test if they are effective and are present in the 'successful' cases and absent
in the 'failed' cases. For the second research question concerning resilient management,
success and failure (resilient or not) will be determined by the continued existence of
traditional management institutions during and / or after periods of external threat. In all
of these case studies, commercial and other outsider 'on the water' fishing encroachment
is the primary threat to local management systems. 'Resilient' management will be
determined by the continued existence and functioning of traditional management
institutions among locals faced with such encroachment.
There is variation across the case studies on who determines 'success' and
'failure' along these criteria. In most of the cases, the authors present these criteria and
often forward their own evaluation on whether the fishery and fishers are 'succeeding' or
'failing'. However, in some cases the author(s) determine success or failure based on
previous research performed by other fieldworkers in the same communities, or the
author(s) proclaim success or failure based on interviews or sample surveys oflocal
artisanal fishers. Thus, there are three main groups that are determining success or
failure: the author(s), previous researchers, and the local artisanal fishers. As I elaborate
on each case study briefly in the next section, I will distinguish how these criteria have
been measured and who is making the determination.

4.2: Case Study Descriptions
I use seven case studies from the Latin American region drawn from previously
published literature in order to answer my two research questions. Table 7 provides
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references, a basic summary of the setting for each case study, and brief notes on results
concerning the two research questions. Five are located in Brazil, one in Peru, and one in
Belize. Four are maritime fisheries, two are riverine (Brazilian Amazon), and one is an
enclosed lake (Lake Titicaca, Peru). Five are almost completely artisanal (consisting of
non-motorized, beachlanding, owner-operated fishing fleets) and the other two are smallscale (at least a quarter of the boats are motorized, but almost all exhibit the two
characteristics of small-scale). Two of the seven case studies are longitudinal with
analysis of community and management system dynamics dating )Jack at least a few
decades. The five non-longitudinal studies are more grounded in the 'ethnographic
present' and systems are analyzed as resilient, successful, and so forth at the time of data
collection (spanning over months) without accounting for long-term historical
trajectories. All seven communities and regions have experienced moderate to severe
outsider fishing encroachment. These experiences with outsider encroachment range from
commercial sector fishing fleets moving in and fishing in what have traditionally been
territories fished by local community fishers to state-owned fleets and even recreational
fishers exploiting traditional territories and nearby waters.
Six of the seven have been defined by their respective authors as 'successful' by
the set of three criteria listed in section 4.1. In some cases, the fishers themselves have
been interviewed and have echoed the author's interpretation or provided such an
interpretation for the author.
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Table 7. Brief Summary of Latin American Case Studies.
Location / Source

Fishery Type

Model Principles

Resilient Management

Bahia, Brazil
Cordell (1984, 1992
with McKean)

Maritime (with
lots of
mangrove and
reef areas)
Artisanal

9 present
- #9 inconclusive

- Defense of in-shore
territories from
commercial
encroachment
- High reciprocity
- Robust shoreline
activities

'Baixo' Region,
Brazil
McGrath (1993)

Caye Caulker,
Belize
King (2000),
Sutherland (1986)

Riverine and
enclosed lakes
Artisanal

Maritime
Small-scale

8 present
- lacks #6 (may
exist, perhaps
not resilient)
- #9 inconclusive

-' Shift to nearby lakes
during rainy season,
commercial
encroachment on rivers

6 present
- lacks: #2, #4,
#10
- #9 inconclusive

- Informal mgmt.
institution breakdown

- High reciprocity

- Relatively less
reciprocity and
shoreline activities
- Costs of maintaining
traditional mgmt.
outweigh benefits
- High influxes of
outside capital and
technology
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Table 7. Brief Summary of Latin American Case Studies (continued)
Location / Source

Fishery Type

Model Principles

Resilient Management

Coqueiral, Brazil
Forman (1970)

Maritime
Artisanal

9 present
- #9 inconclusive

- Defense of in-shore
territories from
commercial
encroachment
- High reciprocity
- Robust shoreline
activities

Lake Titicaca,
Peru
Levieil and Orlove
(1990)
Orlove (2002)

Enclosed lake
Artisanal

9 present
- #9 inconclusive

-'Defense of communal
territories from
outsider encroachment
- High reciprocity (inter
and intra community
exchange)
- Robust shoreline
activities (totora reed
collection)

Rio De Janiero
and Sao Paulo
States, Brazil
Begossi (1998,
2001)

Maritime
Small-Scale

Rio Grande,
Brazil
Castro and Begossi
(1995,1996)

Riverine
Artisanal

10 present

- Defense of in-shore
territories from
commercial
encroachment
- High reciprocity
(information exchange)

4 present
- lacks: #3, #4,
#5,#6,#10
- #9 inconclusive

- Unsuccessful fishery
- Few effective mgmt.
institutions
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The rest of this section provides a profile of the seven case studies. While these
represent a good portion of Latin American artisanal fishery cases documented in the past
three decades, this is not an exhaustive list. These seven were picked mainly because they
fit the 'type' criteria for this analysis (small-scale and I or artisanal, informal management
with an absence of state management institutions) and discussed (whether at length or
briefly) the model principles and resiliency factors to be tested in each of the two
research questions. For a thorough listing of these and other fishery case studies in Latin
America (from journal articles to dissertations), along with an exhaustive bibliography
spanning all sectors of CPRs across world regions and citations of early theory works in
the CPR management literature, see Fenton Martin's Common Pool Resources and

Collective Action: A Bibliography (1989).

Bahia State, Brazil- Cordell (1984, 1992 with McKean)
John Cordell is the primary author of the two chapters cited for this case (the
latter co-authored with Margaret McKean) and the data were collected through various
periods through the 1970s, as early as 1973. Fourteen rural maritime artisanal fishing
communities on the southern coast of Bahia state in northeastern Brazil are analyzed in
this case study. Only a handful oflocal fishers operate small-scale motorized craft. The
vast majority are artisanals that build dugout wood canoes, some with sails attached to
harness prevailing winds to maneuver through these swampy tropical coastal waters.
Bahia fishers are called 'beirados' (,shore-dwellers') because of their focus on exploiting
in-shore waters that are characterized by lots of swampy mangroves; coral reefs, and tiny
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'caye' islands. It is these sorts of 'messy' ecological features of this northern Brazilian
coastline that used to keep inland populations away from fishing this region until
descendants from black plantation laborers inland moved to this area as a means for
subsistence. Most of the current beirado and community population are descendants of
these inland black plantation laborers. Beirados use their catch for both subsistence and
for income from sale in local and regional markets. Some beirados have established
connections with 'middle-men' who transport and market their harvest in nearby regional
markets. Over 200 different species of fish and shellfish are harve$ted. A beirados' catch
must be stored, sold, or transported quickly once landed as ice is not brought on craft as it
hinders the maneuverability of the wooden canoes, even the few motorized ones.
Beirados use a mix of individual and communal forms of property rights on the
coastal waters of these communities. The often sheltered nature of this specific coastline
with the cayes, mangroves, and coral reefs allow for easier visual triangulation methods
in marking individual fishing territories relative to other maritime coastlines lacking such
ecological features. These territories exist mostly on the 'in-shore' waters that are defined
as out to 50 meters from the shore. Individual territories range from 400 to 600 square
kilometers in size. Individual and communal territories are shifted seasonally in a
complex system in order to follow fish that migrate along the coast according to cycles of
the moon that influence tide shifts (see Cordell 1974). Since much of the potential catch
moves with these tides, the beirados do the same, moving their territories on a seasonal
basis to maintain their livelihood through the year. Six factors are used by 'mestres'
('canoe bosses') who are the experienced and respected beirado leaders in order to
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detennine where territories are to be established during each season: current shifts, tidelevel shifts, lighting conditions corresponding with various moon phases, interactions of
wind and current, slope of the sea bottom, and sea bottom conditions.
Brazil's national Ministry of Fisheries, 'Superintendencia do Desenvolvimento de
Pesca' (SUDEPE), maintain that all of Brazil 's coastal waters are public property under
national law. Although this technically and legally means that Bahia coastal waters are
under pure open-access conditions, this has not been the way it has played out in reality
since the beirados have instituted their own infonnal management-system. Low budget
allocations to the fisheries ministry has hindered any state management or monitoring
mechanisms along any of Brazil's coast, especially in the rural and swampy northeastern
Bahia.
Commercial fleet encroachment is becoming a problem as the number of hightech fleets trawling the off-shore waters along the entire Brazilian coastline (including
Bahia) are increasing. This encroachment increased sharply in the early 1970s when
SUDEPE began implementing national policies designed to increase economic incentives
for current and potential commercial entrepreneurs and investors. During this period,
SUDEPE passed three laws influencing the ability of commercial fleets to operate with
increased flexibility. These were: tax exemptions on up to 75 percent of personal income
from fishing, suspensions of import tariffs on advanced fishing technology and craft, and
selective suspensions of federal taxes on catch being shipped to luxury internal and
certain export markets. These factors at the macro level subsidize capital investment by
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commercial fleets and increase their ability to encroach upon small-scale communities
along the Bahia coastline.
Beirados land about 70 percent of the total fish catch along the southern half of
Bahia state. This production level has remained steady and is evidence of environmental
success and lack of over-exploitation. Despite this large contribution of the beirados'
harvest to the local and regional cuisine, there have historically been economic hardships
and a persistence of widespread poverty in this tropical coastal region. This is due mainly
to low prices for species harvested. However, while local market prices may remain low
enough to keep most of the artisanals in more of a subsistence mode, these incomes have
remained rather stable along with total catch. Socially, beirados exhibit a high rate of
reciprocal exchange as observed by Cordell. The author has deemed this case study an
ecological and social success.

In Bahia, in-shore waters are easier to defend by artisanals, since their technology
is more suited for shallower in-shore exploitation. Beirados have successfully defended
their in-shore territories and maintained their informal management system. Cordell
emphasizes how reciprocity and cooperation are high in Bahia, especially concerning
shoreline activities.

Baixo Region, Brazil- McGrath et. al. (1993)
Thirteen rural communities along the Amazon floodplain (known as the 'varzea')
of the 'Baixo' region of the Brazilian Amazon are analyzed in this case study. The Baixo
is the varzea region that stretches from its western border at the convergence of Para and
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Amazonas states east to the mouth of the Xingu River. Local fishers are riverine artisanal.
The year is split into two main seasons by weather conditions, the rainy and dry seasons.

In the rainy season, the varzea rivers overflow and most of the floodplain region is
inundated with water up to the tree-tops. There is such an extreme increase in standing
water that water craft can travel for tens of kilometers north to south beyond the normal
dry season boundaries of the rivers without even touching dry land. This rainy season
creates a major ecological feature of the varzea, lakes that are otherwise small standing
pools during the dry season that range in size from a few thousand square meters to
several hundred square kilometers. These lakes are numerous during the rainy season and
hold a large amount of fish that migrate from the connected rivers for the plankton that
develops as a thick coat on the lakes' surface.
Artisanals use fish both for subsistence and for income from sale in local and
regional markets. Lacking ice and refrigeration, artisanals have traditionally used salt to
dry store their catch. This dry salted fish has been the trademark of the fish sold in the
region. Many travelers (rubber trappers and traders) boating through the region have
stopped and bought this salted fish. Their fish has also been a main portion of the diet for
the urban poor of Belem, the nearest urban area in Para state.
Artisanals are natural resource use pluralists engaging in a rotation of fishing,
small-scale agriculture, and pastoralism. Traditionally and up through the early 1970s,
these three activities were rotated and labor time and energy was near equally split
between them. A decline in the value of jute (the main agricultural crop) has been
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attributed to the introduction of synthetic fibers to Brazil and has influenced the shift
towards more artisanal fishing labor.
Communal property rights exist in the varzea lakes, no individual territories exist.
Communal territories are based on the location of a community relative to the lake and
the lake is divided fairly evenly between the communities surrounding a lake. Artisanal
fishers informally manage these floodwater lakes during the rainy season. The varzeiros
view the lake as theirs in the community sense, while the rivers are more perceived as
open-access and are not under informal management control. Access to the lakes is
therefore limited to those collectively recognized as local community fishers. Certain
technologies, such as gillnets and other new technology inputs, are restricted collectively,
especially when lake waters begin to recede heading into the dry season. Motors are
collectively restricted on the lakes. Ice is also prohibited, which restricts the amount one
fisher can catch since they have to take the time and energy to salt the fish instead. These
are informal management techniques by the varzeiros to prevent over-exploitation during
the 'lean' season allowing for less seasonal variation in actual and potential harvest.
Commercial encroachment appeared in the early 1970s and has steadily increased
since then. Two major factors influenced the rise of commercial encroachment in the
Baixo, post-1950s technology increases of the Brazilian commercial fleets that allowed
for traveling of greater distances and longer trips from port, and a sharp increase in urban
food demand with the hyper-urbanization of the 1970s across Latin America. With
commercial fleets entering the varzea rivers, varzeiro artisanal fishing has been declining
in productivity. Traditionally, varzeiros fished more during the beginnings of the dry
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season in August and September when the two most sought after species, characins and
catfish, migrated upstream in the rivers. However, with commercial fleets focusing on
these species during this time, the catfish especially is the biggest portion of the Baixo
commercial export market, artisanals are turning more to the lakes in order to maintain
production levels.
This case study is successful according to the three criteria. Environmentally,
varzeiros have maintained their fish catch by shifting from river to lake exploitation as
discussed earlier in the face of commercial encroachment. Economically, varzeiros
continue to use their fish catch for both subsistence and income at stable levels. Socially,
varzeiros have found a new sense of collective identity in recent decades since the rise of
commercial encroachment. The urban commercial fleet outsiders that have encroached
along the riverbanks of the Baixo communities have served as a reinforcement of
varzeiro collective identity since they have had to shift to lake fishing and build informal
management institutions appropriate to those resources while also attempting to defend
their local communities against further takeover by commercial enterprises.

Caye Caulker, Belize - King (2000), Sutherland (1986)
Data for this case study spans from the 1960s up to 1997 and is represented by
Anne Sutherland's book (1986) that provides data up to 1986 and Thomas D. King's
follow-up study (2000), which provides data through 1997.
Caye Caulker is a small island northeast of Belize City off the Atlantic coast of
mainland Belize. Caye Caulker is 5 miles from north to south and only half a mile wide at
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its widest point. Such small islands that dot the coast of Belize and other Latin American
nations are often referred to as 'cayes'. There are numerous neighboring cayes to Caulker
of similar size such as Caye Chapel 200 miles south. Caye Caulker is also the name of the
one community on this particular island that is home to about 1,000 residents as of 1997.
The popUlation has more than doubled since the 1980 census that showed 413 residents.
The village itself is nestled on the east side of the caye stretching one mile north to south
and only three blocks east to west. The village is this small because most of the caye

.

consists of swampy mangrove areas that are too marshy for building stable houses. The
nearest urban center is Belize City twenty miles to the southeast of the village, but
separated by about] 0 miles of ocean between the caye and mainland Belize. Commercial
and small-scale owner I operator ferry craft provide transportation from mainland to the
caye multiple times daily.
Caye Caulker fishers are almost all small-scale maritime fishers since they have
motorized craft. Traditional fishers are the descendants of the original inhabitants of Caye
Caulker, refugees from the War of Castes who migrated to the caye from the Yucatan
region of Mexico just north of Belize around] 848. Almost all Caye Caulker residents,
including fishers, are multi-lingual fluent in both English and Spanish. Small-scale
fishers focus mostly on lobster utilizing trapezoid-shaped traps fabricated from wood
about four feet long by one-and-a-half feet wide.
Caye Caulker fishers have been organized in a cooperative since 1960, the
Northern Fishermen Cooperative Society (NFCS). Although this cooperative does what is
outlined in chapter II concerning pooling of capital and attempting to. control external

75
markets through setting production levels and such, the organization also acts as a
meeting place for the fishers who also informally manage their resource. NFCS meetings
are a venue where some of the informal decisions concerning fishing are made and
informal management institutions are created and discussed. Since all the fishers that are
a part of the cooperative also participate in informal management, collective action
management generally occurs within the context of a cooperative meeting. A local fisher
has to be in one to be a part of the other. To be legitimized as a local fisher is to be a
cooperative member.
A mix of individual and communal property rights existed up to 1986 when
individual territories completely saturated all of the accessible coastal waters. Visual
triangulation methods are used to determine individually held territories. Many fishers
have multiple territories recognized as their own and have room to place anywhere from
40 to 100 lobster traps at one time in each territory. Access is regulated through
cooperative registration and most fishers act as monitors for spotting any outsiders that
are not supposed to be accessing their territories.
There are numerous characteristics unique to the Caye Caulker case study
compared with the other six cases. Having access to lobster has allowed fishers to reap
the rewards of extraordinarily high demand beyond local and regional markets. Fishers
process and export to the first world and with their strong cooperative membership and
participation, have effectively maintained strong economic linkages through these
external markets. These high financial returns have allowed the purchase of numerous
technological inputs besides storage and processing facilities, including extra fuel for
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craft and ice for plant or residence storage. However, there is increasing evidence of
economic stratification as certain fishers are accumulating upwards of 1,500 to 2,000
lobster traps that they now import instead of fabricate. Other forms of technology are
being accumulated at a rapid rate by a small number of fishers.
The NFCS built a small processing plant for fishers' use to store, process,
package, and export their spiny lobster catch as a group without having to establish
connections with 'middle-men'. The NFCS was able to build this facility since they have
received increasingly high returns on the highly sought-after lobster species they mostly
sell to the first world. A private entrepreneur from the U.S. even invested in the building
of this facility. Caye Caulker is in a position of having access to a unique and valuable
species in demand by first world consumers.
Commercial fleet encroachment has not occurred at Caye Caulker as it has in
most of the other case studies. However, outsider encroachment in the form of private
wealthy individuals with linkages to regional and global lobster markets is occurring as
they are increasingly purchasing the traditional territories of small-scale fishers. This is
not 'on the water' encroachment initially and does seem to produce less conflict since
transactions occur between private individuals. However, this outsider encroachment is
similar to commercial fleet encroachment in that 'on the water' conflict between outsider
fishers or fleets and traditional fishers can eventually occur when these outsider investors
employ or contract out to commercial fleets to harvest the lobster. Sometimes, the
investor has contracted through an individual that registers with the cooperative, acquires
similar technology, and fishes using traditional methods. In other cases, the investor is
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actually an experienced fisher from another area who performs the work himself.
Whichever of these scenarios, outsider encroachment has increased as the market for
spiny lobster has grown.
Caye Caulker has developed CPR management institutions that have historically
protected all three indicators of success. Environmentally, production levels have been
stable over three decades from 1964 to 1997. There are no significant signs of overexploitation. Economically, Caye Caulker is the biggest success story among all seven
case studies with respect to price levels and economic linkages. N of 1997, lobster prices
were ranging from $12 to $15 (U.S.) per pound. Socially, high levels of intra-fisher and
community solidarity exist. However, while this case study supports some of the effective
model principles, management has not been resilient within the last decade and has begun
to breakdown from outsider encroachment. Specific reasons for this are elaborated on in
chapter V, section 5.2.

Coqueira/, Brazil- Forman (1970)
Shepard Forman authored the book cited for this case study. In 1965, Forman
lived in the small rural community of Coqueiral and collected the data for his
ethnography. Coqueiral is located on the Atlantic coast in Alagoas state of northeastern
Brazil. Coqueiral has approximately 852 residents with about 85 of those being active
maritime artisanal fishers. None of the fishers' crafts are motorized, so they are all
considered artisanal. Fishing is the primary economic activity of Coqueiral. Artisanals
use hook and line technology from the 'janganda' rafts they build from locally gathered
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materials such as light balsa wood ('piuba') and vegetable fibers. Some artisanals attach
sails to their janganda craft to harness prevailing off-shore winds. Artisanal fishers are
called 'jangadieros' (,raft fishermen') locally after their rudimentary wooden craft.
Jangadieros use their catch both for subsistence and for income from sales in local and
regional markets. They often have connections with 'middle-men' known locally as 'fishhawkers' (Forman counted 12 in Coqueiral) who will transport and market their catch in
adjacent markets.
Jangadieros use a mix of individual and communal properJ:y rights. Individual
fishing territories are marked by visual triangulation methods. Jangadieros line up
community markers on-shore and then use depth perception along with 'hand-marking'
(using hand-length to determine distances visually between two markers on-shore) to
measure how far out from shore they are. Whenjangadieros lose sight of visual markers,
often around 50 meters out, they count time corrected for prevailing winds while
journeying beyond sight of the shoreline. When they feel they have reached their specific
territory, they will drop a plumb line to touch the ocean bottom and bring it back up for a
smell test. Rocky bottoms smell sweet, gravel has a distinct 'bad odor', and muddy
bottoms smell more foul. Since each jangadiero intimately knows his particular territory
and the composition of its bottom, this method has historically worked well.
These individual territories exist in a grid system along the coastal stretch of
Coqueiral. They are partitioned taking into account the two main factors the jangadieros
consider as affecting productivity of a fishing spot: depth and ocean bottom composition.
Each of these territories is named after the two visual markers used to triangulate its
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location. Jangadieros distinguish between individual spots, communal territories, and
'lisos' which are unproductive territories that no one fishes in because of their plain level
and sandy ocean bottoms. Both individual and communal territories reach out to 100
meters off-shore where the edge of the continental shelf is and ocean depth drops
substantially and rapidly. Jangadieros distinctly divide the ocean waters between these
two categories of in and off shore waters. Beyond the continental shelf and into the 'offshore' deeper ocean waters, jangadieros say that this part of the ocean is evil and filled
with 'sea monsters'. A jangadiero is 'tempting the devil' ifhe attempts to travel beyond
the in-shore waters beyond 100 meters.
Local residents have notices commercial fleets trawling along the 100 meter mark
in the years prior to and during the 1965 field study. Various types of fleets in this region
include larger motorized boats with seiners or longer nets than the jangadieros'. These
fleets have been trawling along and entering the territories of jangadieros.
Coqueiral is portrayed as a success along the three criteria, especially concerning
social criteria. Environmentally, there is no evidence of over-exploitation as production
levels have remained stable over seven months of Forman's fieldwork. Economically,
income from fish production is steady. Socially, jangadieros show a high amount of
reciprocity including shoreline work activities and 'hanging out' that occurs daily both
intra and inter family. In addition, there is a high amount of inter-generational transfer of
traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) concerning mostly species migration and
weather patterns and information about traditional individual property rights.
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Janganda craft are easily water-logged because the piuba they are made of is
extremely light and porous, piuba wood often weighs less than a similar sized piece of
cork. Such rudimentary technologies need repair often. Thus, shoreline activities are
robust at Coqueiral, a group of jangadieros can be seen daily either repairing their
jangadas or nets along the shoreline or when technology is not in need of repair, simply
'hanging out' engaged in idle conversation. This is where inter-family networks of
reciprocal exchange form and are reinforced. Generally, there is high reciprocity within
and between families in Coqueiral. Food and crafts are the two most often exchanged
items 'leaving little need for money' in the community.

Lake Titicaca, Peru - Levieil and Orlave (1990), Orlave (2002)
This case study is represented by a book authored by Benjamin S. Orlove and one
article co-authored by Dominique P. Levieil and Orlove. Their work studies 151 artisanal
and small-scale fishing communities that surround the highest elevated enclosed lake in
the world, Lake Titicaca, Peru between 1976 to 1984. These are all rural communities as
they do not include the urban lakeshore city of Puno, the nearest urban area and market.
This is the only 'lake' case study included in my analysis. All 151 communities are on
the Peruvian side of the lake (Lake Titicaca crosses the Peru-Bolivia national border) and
average 20 artisanal fishers per community. Over 95 percent of all local community
fishers on the lake are non-motorized artisanal fishers. Half of these artisanals use wood
craft and the other half used reed-sewn 'balsa' rafts the materials for which are gathered
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from reed beds that exist adjacent to each community's informal fishing territory along
the shoreline.
Artisanal fishing is done overnight, with most nets being retrieved in the early
morning hours around dawn. One-sixth of the total catch is used for subsistence and
most, two-thirds, is sold for cash in local and regional markets. Artisanals are natural
resource use pluralists engaging in small-scale agriculture on individually held plots and
pastoralism on communally held grazing pastures in and surrounding their respective
communities. They are also occupational pluralists working in such income-generating
activities as handicraft production and migratory wage labor available in the high lake
region. Although fishing takes 33 percent of an artisanal's labor time on average, it
generates 50 to 75 percent of an artisanal 's household income. This is why fishing is seen
as the primary work by artisanals in the region and other natural resource work and wage
occupations are viewed as supplemental income. Fish species harvested include the
endemic 'Orestia', accounting for 67 percent of total annual catch, and introduced nonnative species (including rainbow trout and silverside) account for 15 percent of the
harvest weight.
Each community exercises informal common-property rights over one fishing
territory. That is, there are at least 151 different fishing territories that fit under the
'communal' definition of type of property rights (see Table 1). Each lakeshore
community has a specifically defined rectangular territory of aquatic space based on
visual triangulation. The width of the lakeshore community determines the width
boundaries and the length out into the middle of the lake for each territory depends on
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factors such as lake bottom depth, slope level, and species available at these certain
depths. Each community informally recognizes neighboring communities' rights to their
respective communal territories. With communal property rights, all fishers in a
community have access to the entire community rectangular territory rather than
individual fishers maintaining separate individual fishing spots. This communal form of
property rights seems to have been an adaptation to the lake's fish species that show high
variability in migration and size both seasonally and annually. Communal rights allow
fishers to exploit a larger territory to respond to such variability rather than maintaining
much smaller individual spots.
The Peruvian national government claims formal/legal rights to the entire waters
of the lake, including the territories informally marked by local artisanals. Registration of
all fishers, regardless of sector, is the responsibility of the national Ministry of Fisheries
according to written law. Enforcement of national rights is the responsibility of the Coast
Guard, but low budgets have hindered such registration and enforcement practices from
their full effective potential.
Still, the Coast Guard does patrol the lake occasionally and it is this, along with
inland 'lakeshore community outsiders' that has encroached on traditional fishing
territories. The high proportionate income seen by local fishers and the impoverished
subsistence conditions of the nearby inland Andean peoples have influenced community
outsiders to attempt to fish on informally allocated fishing territories. The Coast Guard
has occasionally entered the communal territories of certain communities and confiscated
nets from artisanals who are accused of excluding outsiders from attempting to fish in the
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lake. Since the entire lake is formally under the jurisdiction of the Peruvian state, the
Coast Guard officially has the authority to encroach on local management institutions
without fear oflegal challenge.
This case study is deemed a success by the authors on numerous occasions.
Studies prior to the 1990 article (Levieil 1986, Levieil 1987) up to Orlove's 2002
synthesis have noted stable fish harvest levels and no signs of environmental overexploitation. Economically, the previously mentioned focus on fishing as accounting for
half to three-quarters of an artisanal 's household income has beeILstable across the study
period, fishing has been perceived for years as the main income generator for the region's
artisanals. Numerous surveys and interviews reveal high levels of reciprocity and
cooperation between fishers and the fishing communities. Thus, the authors deem this
case study a success based largely on the social data gathered from the fishers
themselves.
It is crucial to note that this is the only case study that explicitly cites one ofthe

two CPR models I have used in my analysis. Orlove (2002) cites Ostrom's (1990) model
as an excellent synthesis of principles found in successful informal CPR management
systems and claims that the Lake Titicaca communities support Ostrom's entire model.
At Lake Titicaca, successful resilient management has been confirmed by
government and researcher censuses of local artisanal fishers. Resiliency has been
achieved through adaptive responses of collective verbal and physical interference and
destruction or theft of outsiders' nets. High reciprocity is present and has been influenced
by high homogeneity and endogamy in lakeshore communities (50 percent of marriages
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are intra-community). There is high inter-community reciprocity as there are frequent
accounts in surveys and interviews of informal reciprocal exchanges occurring between
adjacent community fishers that wish to fish on another community's territory. These
exchanges take various forms from exchanging agricultural products, portions of fish
catch, or buying another fisher a beer. A key shoreline activity for Lake Titicaca
artisanals is totora reed collection.

Rio de Janiero and Sao Paulo States, Brazil- Begossi (1998,2001)
Small-scale maritime fishers of the Atlantic Forest coast in southern Brazil are
analyzed in these two book chapters authored by Alpina Begossi. The data was collected
through various periods in the early and mid-1990s. The study included eight small
adjacent rural communities that lie on the Atlantic coastline between the two nearest
urban centers, Rio de Janiero to the north and Sao Paulo to the south. These eight
communities are deemed 'small' by the author since they have a range from only 26 to
100 families residing in each. Residents share common cultural roots (the population is
referred to as 'Caicaras', native Indian descendants with some mestizo from mixing with
Portuguese) and the cultural homogeneity of this case study is high. Houses in each
community are geographically arranged according to the oldest male's residence. Thus,
nuclear families live in separate houses adjacent to the 'father' or 'grandfather'.
Caicaras fishers build wood canoes, use encircling or gill nets, and also various
types of hook and line methods. Some are artisanal and use paddles and some are smallscale and have motors attached. Caicaras have traditionally been natural resource use
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pluralists shifting between two activities: agriculture and fishing, both of which provide
for subsistence as well as income from sales to local and regional markets. On average,
90 percent of fish catch is sold for income and the other 10 percent is used for
subsistence. Caicaras fishers often use 'middle-men' to transport and sell their catch to
larger communities in the region. Small-scale agriculture here includes four main crops:
manioc, potatoes, yams, and beans. Agriculture was the primary work activity until the
1950s when the Caicaras began shifting to fishing since the market price dropped for
manioc, their main crop. Since then, fishing has become the main source of income for
Caicaras and takes up a majority of their labor time and energy. Two other factors
influenced this shift away from agriculture. First, there is a decreasing amount of land
available since federal and state designated conservation areas are growing along the
Atlantic rainforest. Second, further conflict has erupted between the Ministry of the
Environment and the Caicaras concerning the state's conservation regulations on land
and the Caicaras traditional practice of slash and bum agricultural techniques.
Fish is the main source of protein for Caicaras, constituting over half of their
annual animal consumption. A wide variety of fish are harvested including bluefish,
squid, halfbeak, mullets, sand drum, snook, and catfish. A total of 115 species are
identified by folk name, which correspond to 105 biologically separate species.
The Caicaras' property rights system is a mixture of individual and communal.
There are some specific fishing territories informally recognized as spots belonging to
certain individuals or families. Besides those spots, territories are based on community
location with community fishers having rights to that specific communal territory.
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Commercial encroachment from industrial fishing fleets trawling along the offshore coastal waters has been increasing in the last decade. Sepetiba Bay off the shore
from the community of Itacuruca is experiencing the most intense commercial fleet
encroachment.
Caicaras fisheries are deemed a success by the author. Fish stock abundance and
catch amounts have been stable throughout the study periods. While the prices of
agricultural crops such as manioc have fluctuated widely, the income generated from
fishing has remained relatively stable, as have amounts of catch Slvailable for subsistence.
Socially, fishers exhibit a high rate of information sharing across various topics from
locations of certain species to weather warnings.
There is successful resilient management to commercial fleet encroachment in
this case. Caicaras' adaptive response is 'marking their spot' by constantly being out on
the waters fishing their individual, family, and communal territories to physically resist
in-shore encroachment. They define their in-shore waters by 'marking their spot'.
Caicaras exhibit high reciprocity with high rates of information exchange between
fishers.

Rio Grande River, Brazil- Castro and Begossi (1995,1996)
Two journal articles, both authored by Fabio de Castro and Alpina Begossi, with
data collected over a one year span from March 1988 to February 1989, represent this
case study. The authors collected data through formal and informal interviews, survey
questionnaires, and participant observation while on artisanal craft-during 'on the water'
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fishing labor. Two rural communities, Icem and Frontiera, on the Rio Grande in Brazil
are analyzed in this case study. About 41 riverine artisanal fishers exist in these two
communities bordering two states, Icem on the Sao Paulo state side and Frontiera on the
Minas Gareis side. Icem's population was measured at about 6,500. With only 41 fishers,
fishing is not a major part of the local economy and has decreased in importance over 20
years. Local fishers say that many fellow artisanals outmigrated between the 1970s and
1980s. The construction and opening of a hydroelectric plant upstream in the community
of Marimbondo in 1974 has reduced the quality and economic importance of fishing in
surrounding communities by enticing local fishers to work in the plant. Only three of the
41 fishers still around operate motorized craft, the rest are considered artisanal and build
aluminum canoes. There are three main technologies used for harvesting: gill nets, cast
nets, and longlines. Artisanals use their catch for both subsistence and for income by
selling in local markets.
There are two annual seasons determined by weather patterns at Rio Grande, the
wet 'cheia' season from November to March and the dry 'seca' season from May to
September (April and October considered a third category of ecological conditions,
transition months). Fish stocks are much more abundant in the wet season as productivity
rises sharply and amount of catch per unit of fishing effort increases during these months.
Total fish catch by artisanals drops to only 7 percent in the dry season of what is caught
in the wet season. Dry season income from fish harvest is only 10 percent of what it is in
the wet season. Thus, seasonality is both extreme and quite predictable on Rio Grande.
Fishing work is performed almost exclusively by artisanals during the abundant 'cheia'
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wet season. However, lcem and Frontiera artisanals are both natural resource use and
occupational pluralists during the 'seca' dry season. Roughly 60 percent of artisanals
engage in one or more of the following during the dry half of the year: small-scale
agriculture, wage labor at the nearby distillery, and wage labor in regional construction.
Fishing shifts from the primary income generator in the wet season to a mostly
supplemental subsistence activity in the dry season when wage labor often provides most
Income.
Artisanals informally define individual fishing territories on Rio Grande. There is
no evidence of any other communal property rights present. An informal management
system based on these individual territories exists according to fishers. Individual
territories are recognized informally between fishers, who also resist encroachment by
outsiders whose lines are cut if caught fishing from shore.
Outsider encroachment in this case is mostly tourist / recreational fisher
encroachment. Tourism increased sharply during the late 1970s and has resulted in
conflict between tourists and artisanals over individual fishing territories, mostly during
the transition between the wet and dry seasons. Tourists that fish from the shoreline often
cast their lines into the artisanals' territories as they move more towards the artisanals'
traditional fishing areas away from the shorelines adjacent to the vacation homes and
developing tourist spots downstream.
The authors and fishers interviewed in this case study do not directly deem this
CPR management system as a success or failure. However, there is ample evidence to
deem it failing considering the three main criteria. Environmentally, 'the highly priced and
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sought-after first grade fish such as 'pintado' have decreased in abundance over two
decades. During this decline in first grade fish, a hydroelectric plant was built upstream in
the town of Marimbondo in 1974. General fish mortality has increased since.
Economically, the most abundant fish are now all second grade (and lower priced)
species. Artisanals struggle to harvest any grade fish during dry season and most are
increasingly turning to wage labor to maintain a primary income. Socially, there has been
reports of not only artisanals outmigrating from the communities, but also of intra-group
conflict increasing with decreases in valued fish to catch. Disputes. over individual
territories have also occurred.
Rio Grande is the one case study that is generally failing across the three criteria.
Although artisanals have created property rights and an informal management system, it
does not exhibit many of the model design principles that are found in the more
successful case studies. Only two of the ten principles are found at Rio Grande, compared
to the other case studies that exhibit at least half or more. Most of these model
management institutions are not present and there are few similarities between the other
forms of outsider encroachment detailed in the other studies and tourist fisher
encroachment present in this case. Therefore, this case study is eliminated from the
analysis concerning resilient management in the second research question.
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CHAPTER V
SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter synthesizes the qualitative data from the seven case studies for the
purpose of answering the two research questions of this paper. Section 5.1 addresses the
first research question by consolidating the data on the management design principles
(outlined in the consolidated model of principles) across the case studies. Section 5.2
addresses the second research question by summarizing the importance of 'shoreline
activities' in artisanal fishing communities and analyzing how these activities affect the
continued existence and functioning of traditional management institutions in the face of
outsider encroachment. Section 5.3 provides a brief synthesis of the main arguments and
discussion of the results. Section 5.4 concludes with a discussion on the limitations of the
case study data and suggestions on how those limitations can be improved upon in future
research.
The case studies show that there are unique cultural and social patterns in
artisanal fishery communities that promote resiliency in the face of external threats such
as commercial encroachment. The case study approach has proven very useful in
identifying and illuminating the questions of common-property and the management
institutional structures that lead to success or failure in dealing with ePRs (Burger, et. al.
2001).
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5.1: Research Question #1
This section consolidates the descriptive data from the seven case studies
concerning the ten principles of the synthesized model outlined in chapter II (see Table
4). This first research question is: do the often cited Ostrom (1990) and Baland and
Platteau (1996) models for informal CPR management hold up in the case of Latin
American fisheries? Each principle is briefly discussed by outlining which case studies
exhibit that respective principle as a sort of 'test' of the model. This will help determine
whether the six successful case studies exhibit all, most, or a certain set of principles
compared to the one unsuccessful case study (Rio Grande). Elaboration is provided on
certain case studies that exhibit uniquely effective or ineffective results concerning each
respective principle.

1. Clearly Defined Boundaries
The first criterion for successful CPR management is that the boundaries of the
resource be clearly established. All seven case studies, even the one deemed
'unsuccessful' exhibit clearly defined boundaries that are informally recognized and
adhered to by most local fishers. There are two types of boundaries covered by this
design principle. First, when individual and / or communal rights to territories exist, the
boundaries of those territories must be coherent and collectively recognized by users.
Also, the entire CPR itself (within which those individual and / or communal rights exist)
must be highly coherent and collectively recognized. Three case studies (Bahia,
Coqueiral, Lake Titicaca) show the most rigid and collectively recognized boundaries
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concerning the entire CPR area under informal management relative to the other case
studies. However, all seven cases do exhibit highly coherent boundaries on both
individual and communal territories.

2. Congruence between Appropriation and Provision Rules and Local Conditions
The second criterion for successful CPR management is basically that there be
rules in place that restrict technologies and / or harvesting amounts that are not
appropriate for the user group given the environmental, economi<;, and social conditions
of the CPR and the user group. Six of the seven case studies show high congruence in
their appropriation and provision rules (Bahia, Baixo, Coqueiral, Lake Titicaca, Rio de
Janiero / Sao Paulo States, Rio Grande).
The Coqueiral and Rio de Janiero / Sao Paulo States case studies show that
technology diffusion from outsiders occurs mainly when it is congruent with local
ecological and social conditions. For example, opportunities to integrate more advanced
boats by the raft fishermen of Coqueiral were rationally discarded as not being potentially
as congruent with maneuvering in the swampy coastal areas of the northern Brazilian
coast despite the more sturdy and advanced structures ofthe boats (Forman 1970).
In the Baixo case study, varzeiros developed access rules that are congruent with
local conditions. The drastic shifts in floodwater levels and seasonality in the Baixo led
varzieros to collectively enforce restrictions on gillnets during the most productive parts
of the year in order to maintain enough catch during less productive times when the
floodwaters recede and they must compete with commercial fishers' on the rivers.
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The Bahia, Lake Titicaca, and Rio Grande cases show high congruence especially
concerning technology provisions appropriate for local conditions. The one case that
shows less is the Caye Caulker case. The rapid increases in imported technology through
high returns on lobster sales have contributed to this. There exist few to no informal
mechanisms for restricting technological advancement and there is a growing potential
for over-exploitation, over-saturation, and non-congruence at Caye Caulker.

3. Collective-Choice Arrangements
The third criterion for successful CPR management is that decision-making
processes concerning creating and changing rules are inclusive of the entire user group.
Six of the seven case studies show high levels of inclusiveness in collective decisionmaking (Bahia, Baixo, Caye Caulker, Coqueiral, Lake Titicaca, Rio de Janiero / Sao
Paulo States). In these six cases, there were few fishers that had claimed to have been
unjustly excluded from the informal fishers' organizations. Those that do complain of
discrimination are recognized by active fishers as having deserved such social sanctions
because they had broken informal rules (see the next two principles, monitoring and
sanctions). Fishers report few problems with inclusiveness in these cases.
The Rio Grande case study illustrates a case where collective decisions are less
inclusive. With high rates of outmigration of artisanal fishers to other communities (often
for wage labor) collective-choice arrangements are beginning to disintegrate. The main
factor here is technology. While most of the fishers have adhered to technological
provisions congruent with their Amazonian riverine ecosystem, a few artisanals have
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turned small-scale by leasing motorized boats from newly formed local boat rental shops
that are serving mostly tourists. These fishers have gone outside the user group to acquire
such motorized tech and this has caused the erosion of informal management
enforcement and inclusion.

4. Monitoring
The fourth criterion for successful CPR management is that monitors exist, are
collectively recognized, and are accountable to the other users. MQIlitoring
responsibilities include watching other users' activities while they use the CPR in order
to prevent any rulebreaking and also watching for community outsiders that are not
supposed to use the CPR. Five of the seven case studies exhibit effective monitoring
mechanisms that hold members accountable to the other fishers through effective
collective-choice arrangements (Bahia, Baixo, Coqueiral, Lake Titicaca, Rio de Janiero /
Sao Paulo States).
In Bahia, 'mestres' are experienced and respected artisanals that constitute
leadership in beirados' informal management system. They are the group most
responsible for monitoring, not only for the lunar-tide cycles that determine where
territories are to be setup, but also for community outsiders and rulebreakers on the
waters.
At Lake Titicaca, totora reed bed collection is a major factor in monitoring.
Totora reeds grow in what are often termed 'sunken gardens' (or 'reed beds') that stand
adjacent to the shoreline of fishing communities. The collection of tot ora reeds promotes
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monitoring for outsiders on the community fishing territory. Also, artisanal fishers are
very familiar with each other since they tend to fish solo on their own separate craft and
average over 200 fishing trips out 'on the water' each year. The recognizability of
traditional fishers and the shoreline activity of totora collection promote informal
monitoring at Lake Titicaca. The Baixo, Coqueiral, and Rio de Janiero / Sao Paulo States
cases all have systems that rely on well-known and respected fishers (as in Bahia) whose
job is to watch for rulebreakers and monitor weather patterns.
By contrast, the Caye Caulker case has no monitoring mecpanisms, but effective
graduated sanctions. Caye Caulker lobster fishers have historically had a small portion of
their daily catch stolen from their traps by a few long-time community members and
some regular outsiders that enter the community. It is common for a fisher to retrieve his
traps and find at least one or two of them being empty. This is contributed to the lack of
monitoring mechanisms discussed earlier. The lack of monitoring has resulted in this
small 'robber economy' allowing a few certain individuals to routinely steal a few
lobsters per day. Over the years these robbers have been spotted inadvertently at various
times and have become the 'known thieves' of the community. Since fishers have at least
40 traps or more that they retrieve daily, this is not a big enough dent in their livelihood
to necessarily implement monitoring mechanisms to keep eye on such robbers. Fishers
here tend to view the time and energy costs of monitoring as outweighing the benefits of
saving a few lobster per day since Caye Caulker lobster are so highly demanded, sell at
such high prices across scales, and catch amounts are rather steady.
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In the Rio Grande case, fishers show neither monitoring mechanisms nor
graduated sanctions. With a riverine fishery that has a smaller CPR area than the other
cases, it seems as though this is one reason why individual fishers have not been given
specific responsibilities of monitoring.

5. Graduated Sanctions

The fifth criterion for successful CPR management is that graduated sanctions
(punishments) exist and are enforced appropriately considering the, seriousness of the
offense. Six of the seven case studies exhibit graduated sanctions where active social
ostracization or other informal methods of punishing known rulebreakers effectively keep
these rulebreakers from repeating a similar act (Bahia, Baixo, Caye Caulker, Coqueiral,
Lake Titicaca, Rio de Janiero / Sao Paulo States).
In Bahia, sanctions are brought against rulebreakers that fish in territories not
their own. Sanctions include sabotaging equipment and crossing or entangling nets. The
lack of monitoring at Caye Caulker was discussed earlier and how 'known thieves' are
present and tolerated as long as they only take a certain small portion of an otherwise
bountiful harvest. However, strong collective mechanisms exist to socially ostracize
thieves and ensure they never gain membership in the NFCS cooperative. When a
'known thief does take an extraordinary amount, fishers have been known to extract
revenge in some cases.
At Lake Titicaca, sanctions are brought against outsiders who crossover
communal territory boundaries. A survey of 251 local artisanals with- follow-ups on
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reported victims of sanctioning verifies the existence of such mechanisms. The Baixo,
Coqueiral, and Rio de Janiero I Sao Paulo States cases show similar evidence of
sanctioning mechanisms. However, Rio Grande artisanals seem to have lower levels of
sanctioning compared to the other six cases.

6. Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms
The sixth criterion for successful CPR management is that there be specific
mechanisms for resolving conflict between users that are

accessib~e

to most, if not all

users in the group. Five of the seven case studies show strong informal mechanisms for
resolving user group conflicts. The Bahia and Rio de Janiero I Sao Paulo States cases
show the most intricate management institutional arrangements. In the Rio de Janiero I
Sao Paulo States case, there are two main types of Caicaras conflict resolution
mechanisms depending on which community one is in. One is based on a kinship lineage
system, where elderly men who are well respected provide the final say in collective
action decision-making and disputes. The other type is based on participation and
experience, where the same sort of mechanisms exist, but management leadership is
based not as much on age, but on a history as an active participant in collective resource
management.
In Bahia, when disputes arise among beirados, 'aconselheiros' ('mediators') are
sought after to resolve conflicts. Aconselheiros are either retired and well-respected
fishers or sometimes even the widows of retired fishers. These aconselheiros are
informally placed in such a respected position collectively by beirados due to their vast
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fishing and community experience and have been successful in maintaining high levels of
'respeito' among beirados with little intra-group splintering.
The Baixo and Rio Grande cases show relatively weak conflict resolution
mechanisms. Varzeiros fishers in the Baixo region are successful and exhibit a majority
of the other model principles, but access to conflict resolution seems weak as there is
some evidence of internal and external conflict persisting in a few cases. Conflictresolution mechanisms, especially concerning insiders v. commercial outsiders, are less
well developed and there has been evidence of increased conflict sjnce the arrival of
commercial encroachers on the rivers. This may be a signal that while other effective
management institutions of the varzeiros have shown resiliency in the face of external
threats, conflict-resolution mechanisms are perhaps the exception and have broken down
with increased pressure from urban outsiders entering their isolated rural communities. At
Rio Grande, artisanals are increasingly involved in conflict within their artisanal user
group concerning access to motorized technology and with respect to recreational fishing
tourists on-shore. This weakening or absence of conflict-resolution mechanisms is
perhaps due to the growing technological dualism between artisanal and a few smallscale fishers. Such increased dualism may result in more differences and splintering
between the fishers that are converting to small-scale technology.

7. State Tolerance of Local Management Systems
The seventh criterion for successful CPR management is that local management
institutions are not seriously challenged or threatened by external government authorities.
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While the Lake Titicaca case reveals some efforts by the state to thwart informal/local
management systems and implement their own system, all seven case studies do exhibit
informal management systems and even in the Lake Titicaca case, are experiencing little
to weak enforcement by the state. Even in the Brazilian coastal cases (Bahia, Coqueiral,
Rio de Janiero / Sao Paulo States) where the Brazilian government technically and legally
can enforce their 'ocean as public property' law, the state does not possess the necessary
resources to effectively fund formal enforcement mechanisms.
The remaining cases also show that while the state is not lipked or integrated
operationally with local informal systems, these governments have historically tolerated
these systems. Thus, a relationship of 'separated tolerance' is perhaps the best way to
describe these case studies (excluding the Lake Titicaca case) since the states are not
legitimizing these informal management systems, but are also not attempting to enforce
their own state property rights or management institutions to supercede local institutions.
Again, this is often due to a lack of capital to fund regional and local fishery councils and
other formal enforcement mechanisms.

8. Users' Demands for the Resource

The eighth criterion for successful CPR management is that there be high demand
for the resource from users and that the resource is perceived as a vital contributor to their
continued survival. All seven case studies show high demand for the resource by users.
These fisheries are either the main provider of subsistence and income for local families
in a line of other natural resource work (Baixo, Lake Titicaca, Rio de- Janiero / Sao Paulo
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States, Rio Grande) or are nearly the exclusive provider of subsistence and income and
constitute almost all labor inputs (Bahia, Caye Caulker, Coqueiral). Whether substantially
engaged in natural resource use pluralism or not, these fisheries provide the majority of
subsistence and income for these local families.

9. User Knowledge of Sustainable Yields
The ninth criterion for successful CPR management is that users exhibit high
knowledge of the amount of resource units that can be extracted wbile allowing for that
same amount to be extracted into the future. The highest user knowledge seems to be
among the Caicaras fishers in the Rio de Janiero / Sao Paulo States case. High traditional
ecological knowledge (TEK) is present among the Caicaras and indigenous maybe the
distinguishing factor for this principle as the Caicaras are the only Indian fisher group out
of the seven case studies. There is partial evidence for other groups, such as the
northeastern Brazilian artisanals in the Bahia and Coqueiral cases having specific TEK in
areas besides sustainable yields (such as seasonal weather patterns, tide shifts, how ocean
bottom content affects species catch and migration, and so forth). However, the data on
sustainable yields in these specific studies remains somewhat incomplete and
inconclusive.

JO. Mutual Obligation and Concern for Social Reputation between Users

The tenth criterion for successful CPR management is that there be a strong sense
of concern and commitment for mutual obligation between users. This is quite similar to
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the concept of 'reciprocity'. Reciprocity, like mutual obligation, is an act of exchange
between two persons, acts of self-sacrifice or unsolicited kindness. In a small-scale
fishing community, some examples include buying a beer or meal for another fisher or
potential fisher, offering to carry materials or offer materials to help repair one another's
boat or net, sharing portion of a day's catch when a fisher experiences a surplus (Pollnac
1991). Such acts need not necessarily be immediately 'repaid' by the recipient and can
take a variety of forms.
Five of the seven cases exhibit high levels of reciprocity between users (Bahia,
Baixo, Coqueiral, Lake Titicaca, Rio de Janiero / Sao Paulo States) compared to the two
other cases (Caye Caulker, Rio Grande). The highest reciprocity levels are in two cases
that also exhibit almost all of the other model principles (Bahia and Lake Titicaca). This
reciprocal exchange is one main factor that accounts for resiliency of the other effective
management institutions across the five case studies. Factors that account for reciprocity
in these cases, such as robust shoreline activities, are elaborated on in the next section.

5.2: Research Question #2
This section attempts to answer the second research question by expanding the
arguments on what accounts for adaptive responses and resiliency of effective
management institutions. The second research question is: what factors increase the
resilience of local management systems in the face of pressures from commercial
encroachment in Latin American small-scale fisheries? Adaptive management responses
are present in the five case studies where moderate to high levels of fisher reciprocity are
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also present. In such cases with high reciprocity, especially in the Bahia, Coqueiral, and
Lake Titicaca examples, this reciprocity is influenced by shoreline activities.

Adaptive Responses and Resilient Management
Many adaptive responses by artisanal fishers involve defining and negotiating inshore (near-shore) waters as their fishing territory. Such a response is only a first step, but
since artisanal technology often prohibits distant water fishing from the shoreline, many
remain within a mile of the shore when on the waters (McGoodwill 1990). When coastal
lagoons and 'caye' islands dot the coastal shoreline, these often act as unofficial
boundaries between 'in-shore' and 'off-shore' waters (Cordell 1984, King 2000,
Sutherland 1986). Thus, in the cases of reciprocity and effective informal management
institutions, small-scale and artisanal fishers respond first by defining and negotiating
access to in-shore waters with commercial fleets. These agreements may allow the
commercial sector to operate on the more distant waters off-shore from the community.
Adaptive responses that promote resiliency in the face of outsider encroachment,
including the successful defense of in-shore waters and traditional fishing territories, are
influenced by two main factors. The first is reciprocity and the other is that the benefits of
relying on traditional territorial use and management systems outweigh the costs of
keeping them. The existence of high user group reciprocity and situations where the
perceived benefits outweigh the perceived costs of continued use and informal
management of the fishery promote the adaptive responses that constitute resiliency.
More specifically:
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•

Reciprocity is highly dependent on robust shoreline activities often found in
artisanal fishing communities. These activities provide the opportunity
contexts within which reciprocal exchange is first offered and then repeated to
create reciprocity networks. Artisanal fishers will often rely on such reciprocal
exchange concerning labor activities because of the high risks and
uncertainties associated with fishing outlined in previous chapters.

•

Cost-benefit analysis includes two main variables: costs of defending
territories is shared more or less equally between

users~

the perception of

benefits of maintaining traditional management versus the perception of
benefits possible by allowing outsiders to enter and alter that system must side
with traditional management.
In cases of robust shoreline activities and where perceived benefits outweigh perceived
costs by local fishers, adaptive responses to outsider encroachment do exist. Shoreline
activities are especially robust in three case studies showing the highest levels of
reciprocity and resiliency (Bahia, Coqueiral, Lake Titicaca).
In the case study that is not showing resiliency in the face of outsider
encroachment, Caye Caulker (where outsiders are encroaching on traditional territories
and little to no defense responses from local fishers are occurring) the two main factors of
shoreline activities and benefits outweighing costs are not present. Since the Caye
Caulker fishers are almost all motorized 'small-scale' (and not artisanal), concentrated
shoreline activities have not been as robust as in most other case studies with higher
percentages of artisanal fishers. Also, there are two main factors that'have uniquely
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influenced Caye Caulker fishing that are not present in the other cases. The first is that
lobster is a unique and highly demanded species that is connected to globalized markets
and has generated relatively high economic returns. The cooperative organization
instituted by local fishers themselves has actually helped by maintaining strong market
positions through collective action and creating relatively strong backward economic
linkages. With lobster prices rising, each fisher has seen a rapid jump in income along
with the fisher cooperative group as a whole.
This rapid influx of capital has influenced the second factor concerning costbenefit analysis, the rapid rise in the use of sophisticated fishing technology. Recent
influxes of monetary capital have been used to purchase new technology. Technology has
thwarted traditional territories since they expanded the exploitation capabilities of some
local fishers. High economic returns from lobster resulted in higher intra-group and
community social stratification between cooperative and non-cooperative fishers. With
such luxuries, some of these fishers now see more costs than benefits in maintaining
traditional management practices and territories.
Also with higher financial returns, fishers are now able to pay for their sons'
formal education in Belize City or abroad and send them off to school instead of teaching
them fishing techniques and handing down their property rights. As King documented in
1997, the next generation are beginning to out-migrate, threatening the familial line of
traditional fishing. Since fathers have no family member to pass their territory on to,
increasingly small-scale fishers are selling their fishing territories to community
outsiders. These outsiders are usually either regional migrants that want to break into
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fishing or representatives of private fish marketers who wish to contract with a fisher to
exploit lobster and sell directly to them for a lower price.
Informal management institutions are breaking down at Caye Caulker with
increasing outsider control of fishing territories. The two main factors influencing this
breakdown are the high influxes of capital from a highly demanded lobster species and
the increased use of imported technology. This technology increase has led to accessible
waters being exploited to the point that most fishers say it is not worth the costs of
traveling out to farther off-shore waters to attempt and find new t~rritories.
Unlike at Caye Caulker where new technology broke down traditional
management systems, technology produced a different result in Coqueiral. Because it was
congruent with local conditions and control over technological innovations was regulated
by local 'big-wigs', jangadieros were able to institute informal technology restriction
mechanisms to collectively control their adoption of new technologies. The local landowning 'big-wigs' at the top of the Coqueiral social and economic hierarchy are often the
ones that have the external connections and capital for new forms of technology. Thus,
they are often the ones that introduce new technology to the peasants in the community,
and unless these new technologies are congruent with the jangadieros' traditional
practices and ecological fishing conditions, they do not adopt it.

Shoreline Activities

It is crucial when analyzing artisanal fishers and the operation of the fishery to
distinguish between 'on the water' work activities (fishing, gathering nets, etc.) and 'off
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the water' shoreline work activities (McGoodwin 1990, Pollnac 1991, Acheson 1981).
Shoreline work activities are an important characteristic unique to artisanal fishing that
set it apart from other sectors of fishing and from other natural resource sector work.
While the stereotypical view of fishers involves the 'on-water' work of gathering fish, the
reality is that most of their time is spent 'on-shore' (Pollnac 1991). Artisanal fishers
spend time and energy 'off the waters' gathering, building, and maintaining / repairing
their fishing technology (McGoodwin 1990).
This intimately relates back to two points discussed earlier. In the first place,
artisanal fishers rely on non-motorized and simple fishing technology (boats, nets, hooks,
lines, and so on) often made by hand from locally gathered materials. The use oflocal
materials reflects a lack of the necessary financial capital to purchase or import synthetic
materials. In addition, artisanal fishers most often perform their 'on the water' labor
during one stretch of time, whether overnight (as discussed earlier) or at other hours. A
day's fishing trip 'on the waters' varies in length depending on numerous factors such as
type of technology used, seasonal period offish availability, and many of the other
ecological factors previously mentioned. The point is since most artisanal fishing trips are
done in one stretch of time seldom lasting more than one-third to one-half of the day, that
leaves the rest of the day or night to the gathering, building, and maintaining of artisanal
fishing technology.
The two most common used materials to construct fishing craft by artisanal
fishers are wood and reeds (although aluminum and other materials are sometimes used).
A reed is a finger-thin, flexible / bendable, greenish-brown fiber that can grow in tightly
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packed bunches of dozens or more in marsh mixtures of salt and fresh waters that often
exist adjacent to coastal shorelines (Chapman 2003). Reeds see heavy use in Latin
America in ecosystems where wood does not grow or is not closely available, such as
before wood was imported to the Lake Titicaca region of Peru and currently on the
hyperarid desert coast of Peru in artisanal fishing communities such as Huanchaco and
Chiclayo where wood does not exist (Orlove 2002, Chapman 2003). Since they grow and
thrive in such marsh and floodplain type environments, reeds are easily grown along

.

coastal shorelines of oceans, large lakes, and even rivers where such ecological
conditions exist.
How close such materials are to the shoreline will also influence the amount of
their use for fishing purposes. Costs of gathering and carrying such wood or reed
materials are lessened the closer they are to shore. Artisanal fishing technology tends to
degenerate quickly, especially for maritime fishers who have to deal with higher
concentrations of rough and corrosive salt water (Acheson 1981). Reeds often exhibit
faster deterioration than wood and reed craft. The hand-woven 'caballitos de totora' of
Huanchaco and Chiclayo Peru corrode so rapidly that they are replaced an average of
every 30 to 40 days by the fishers (Balagna 2002, Chapman 2003). Constructing a new
craft every month or few months, along with the constant maintenance of re-tying and
stitching fishnets, gathering used soda bottles to use as bobbers, gathering nearby wood
or reeds and carrying it to shore, and setting up finished craft on-shore are all just some of
the shoreline labor activities often done during mid-day by artisanal fishers (McGoodwin
1990).
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One reason why these activities take place on the shoreline is because it is less
costly to gather the materials that are already close to shore and work with them there
instead of constantl y hauling these materials (when in the case of wood and reeds for
craft can be quite large bundles weighing upwards of hundreds of pounds) back and forth
between a fishers' residence (which can sometimes be quite distant if engaging in natural
resource use pluralism and farming inland) and the shoreline. Since the fishing
technology is used for 'on the water' labor, then it is advantageous to keep such
cumbersome gear as close to the water as possible. This is one re,ason why in many
artisanal fishing communities, craft can be seen standing upright leaned up against
barricades or shoreline walls that separate nearby shoreline roads or tracks from the sand
beach. In other contexts, artisanal fishers store their wood boats in the water tied to shore
docks or some other stable device on shore by rope.
There are other labor inputs not directly associated with the actual harvesting of
the extracted unit in other natural resource sectors such as agriculture, pastoralism, and
forestry. However, the specific dynamics of shoreline activities with artisanal fishing are
quite unique and set it apart from these other natural resource sectors and apart from
other fishing sectors as well. It is these shoreline activities that not only account for the
majority of artisanal fisher labor, but it is also this unique spatial and temporal quality to
labor that promotes strong informal reciprocity bonds between fishers (McGoodwin
1990, McGoodwin 2001). Working on fishing technology along the shoreline can
influence reciprocal exchanges of labor and goods between fishers. These shoreline
activities associated with artisanal fishing coupled with benefits outweighing costs in
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maintaining traditional management institutions may account for the adaptive responses
in times of external threat.
So what exactly are 'shoreline reciprocity networks' in regards to artisanal
fishing? Artisanal fishers spend most of their work time not on the waters fishing, but on
the shoreline gathering, building, and repairing their fishing technology as discussed
earlier (Pollnac 1991). This is the context in which reciprocity occurs (Cordell 1984,
Forman 1970, OrIove 2002). Examples of 'shoreline reciprocity' are vast and include acts
both on the waters fishing and non-fishing activities

(McGoodw~n

1990). Reciprocity

networks are built between certain fishers that are either kin or have developed a
friendship (often based on networks of kin ties) (Cordell 1984, Cordell and McKean
1992). This reciprocity in practice increases each fishers' opportunities to show their
worth through acts of self-sacrifice and also allows each to measure the worth and 'sense
of fair play' involved with other fishers (Cordell 1984).
It is crucial to distinguish between types of reciprocities. Sahlins' (1972) typology

serves as a guidepost to distinguish between three basic types of reciprocities:
generalized, balanced, and negative. These three types differ across three variables:
immediacy (in practice as well as in expectation) of returns, equivalence of returns, and
the material and mechanical dimensions of exchange.
In the five case studies exhibiting high reciprocity, this reciprocity is most often
times balanced. There is an expectation of return without which will result in social
consequences such as loss of rights or ostracization. There is almost always an
expectation of equal to near equal return depending on the ability of the indebted fisher to
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'repay' (Cordell 1984). However, this shoreline reciprocity in the five case studies does
not meet the ideal criteria of 'perfect' or 'precise' balanced reciprocity since exchange
rarely occurs without delay and it is expected that time will pass before a reciprocal act is
repaid. The giver of such acts often remembers acts of self-sacrifice and it is this
cognitive mechanism that serves as the informal measure of trust and worth of fellow
fishers in these case studies.
Such reciprocity is one major factor that accounts for the responsiveness and
inclusiveness of collective action mechanisms required for succe§sful informal CPR
management, especially in response to pressures for change. When there is a high sense
of reciprocity present in a fisher community, the fishers are more likely to respond
rapidly, promote inclusiveness in decision-making, and incorporate observational
information from more fishers in decision-making.

5.3: Conclusion and Implications

Table 7 summarizes the presence or absence of CPR model principles (from Table
4) across the case studies. The six successful Latin American artisanal case studies
exhibited a majority of the model principles (six or above, most had at least eight) while
the one unsuccessful/failing case study exhibited the lowest number of these principles,
only four. The case studies support the validity of Ostrom's ideal-type CPR management
principles. However, the additional factors added by Baland and Platteau are only
partially supported. Three of the Baland and Platteau additional principles were
discounted beforehand ('costs of exclusion technology', 'physical overlap between the
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CPR and users' residences', and 'size ') due to the first two being incongruent with
fisheries and 'size' being discounted because of theoretical questions raised by other
scholars. One of the remaining three, 'knowledge of sustainable yields' is inconclusive.
However, the remaining two Baland and Platteau principles, 'user demands for the
resource' and 'mutual obligation' seem to be supported by the case studies. The physical
environment and specific institutional factors from Ostrom's model are influential in
promoting effective informal artisanal fishery management. In addition, the two
characteristics of the user group cited by Baland and Platteau are.influential as well.
While these models of design principles have been empirically tested, they have
not been thoroughly examined specifically concerning Latin America or Latin American
artisanal fisheries before this analysis. Schlager and Ostrom (1993) represents one of the
most thorough tests of Ostrom's model in a comparative analysis of thirty artisanal and
small-scale coastal fishery case studies worldwide from a variety of first and third world
regions. Their study is primarily concerned with examining variation among fishers that
hold more or less 'powerful' bundles of rights. Their findings show that fishers holding
rights of exclusion and transferability over their territory or within the larger fishery itself
are much more successful at reducing conflict and assignment problems and limiting
technological externalities. Their work evaluates how certain property rights
arrangements in a fishery influence success across a range of environmental, economic,
and social criteria. They find that different levels of rights held by users affect
management effectiveness. In general, Ostrom's model is supported by their results.
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The present analysis complements their study by focusing on Latin America and
expands their discussion on how resilience of management institutions is achieved. The
results seem to indicate that while Ostrom's model is strong, parts of the Baland and
Platteau model may not be generalizable across the fishery sector. However, Baland and
Platteau do add perhaps the most crucial factor in regards to the promoting resilience of
the other principles, that being 'mutual obligation' / 'reciprocity'.
The failed case study specifically lacks the more 'community' and inclusive
mechanisms such as effective collective-choice arrangements, mqnitoring, sanctioning,
and conflict resolution measures (along with exhibiting high 'mutual obligation') that
most of the other more successful cases exhibit. These management institutions require
high levels of intra-group trust and the tenth factor of 'mutual obligation' seem to be the
most crucial in determining the three broad criteria of success and maintaining traditional
fishery management.
An interesting note to research question #2, the cases also show a major
commonality in that there are fewer costs associated with transferring individual property
rights / fishing territories when these individual territories are based in high homogeneity
(family / kin) networks. Five ofthe seven case studies show that when the user group is
highly homogeneous in terms of familial relations, transferring rights inter-generationally
has historically been effective discounting any large influxes of capital and / or adoption
of technologies (Bahia, Caye Caulker, Coqueiral, Lake Titicaca, Rio de Janiero / Sao
Paulo States). Homogeneity in this particular context seems to facilitate the longevity of
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property rights systems and can also increase perceived benefits when facing costs
associated with defending territories.
The results suggest that CPR management institutional design and procedures do
matter in regards to the overall success and stability of fisheries. However, fishery
shoreline activities influence reciprocity networks and strengthen effective adaptive
responses of defending in-shore territories from various types of outsider encroachment.
Shoreline activities and in-shore territories are two unique 'spatial elements' ofartisanal
fishing communities that need to be taken into account when analyzing resilience of
traditional livelihoods in the face of outsider encroachment and other forms of external
threat.

5.4: Study Limitations and Future Research
Availability of relevant data has been a limitation of this report. As a masters
degree student lacking the funds to support original field research, I have had to rely on
published scholarly journals and books to provide case study data. I have had access to
Utah State University libraries, University of Utah libraries, and an inter-library loan
system for searching and gathering Latin American artisanal fishery case studies. I feel
that I have covered all of the readily available cases of research on artisanal fisheries in
Latin America. Nevertheless, I may have unintentionally missed some appropriate and
relevant studies, such as those presented in unpublished manuscripts or data reports
sitting in other libraries.
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This limited availability of published research has influenced the time and spatial
scope and significance of the data as well. Two cases, Bahia and Coqueiral, are at least
three decades old and although two of the cases are longitudinal (Caye Caulker and Lake
Titicaca), none have data within a half-decade of this report. Therefore the significance of
the results for early 21 sl century fishing industry dynamics may be limited by changes in
the underlying social, political, and market conditions. As stated above, these studies are
defined as a success or failure by the given criteria at the time of data collection. As a
result, it is not known if the 'success' documented above has exten.ded into more recent
periods.
It would certainly be interesting and fruitful for future researchers to return to one

or more of these study sites and document what change has occurred. The arguments on
destabilization vs. integration outlined in chapter III could be a crucial focus of such
analyses. Also, one could examine if more technologies among commercial fishing fleets
have had new and more potent impacts on traditional management systems. Are those
traditional management institutions that continued to exist a few months to years after the
first signs of commercial encroachment still in existence and operating effectively? Have
they been replaced by different informal management institutions adapted to a new
context of survival or competition with commercial fleets? If commercial fleets continued
to exist in and around the community fishery, there is a greater chance that artisanal
fishers are more likely to have been integrated into these commercial networks.
Future research could also improve upon the spatial limitations of this report in
three respects. First, access to a wider range of works could allow fof. a wider
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geographical range of studies to be selected. Four of the seven cases in this report are
from coastal Brazil and two are from Peru, leaving many Latin American nations and
their respective fisheries unrepresented. A wider sample could allow for more confidence
that the observed patterns are typical of the Latin American region. A larger sample could
also examine differences in the various types of Latin America fisheries (e.g., maritime,
riverine, and lake). For example, in-shore territories such as mangrove swamps and
'caye' islands might be easier for artisanals to defend from outside encroachment.
Finally, since there is one case study in this report (Caye Caulker, Beljze) that can also
technically be classified as 'Caribbean' because of its heavily English-speaking
population and historical cultural roots linked more to black Caribbean populations,
cultural arguments concerning reciprocity and shoreline activities specific to the Latin
American region are difficult. Building a theory of cultural elements common to Latin
American small-scale fisheries is not possible in this report.
Most of all, future studies should focus on the relationships among adaptive
management, reciprocity network structures and shoreline activities. Distinguishing
between types of reciprocity found in these types of artisanal fisher groups and focusing
more on how shoreline reciprocity networks arise, persist, and change would add to the
artisanal fishery literature. While this report has often sacrificed in-depth analysis on
certain topics for a more general review of various literatures, a detailed case study on
reciprocity network dynamics and structure would help verify and extend the arguments
presented here.
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Future research would also be able to examine two other issues that were ignored
in this report. First, the larger community context within which fishing sub-communities
exist should be examined in more detail. This would entail gathering details on the
dynamics between larger community social relations and how those affect fisher group
relations. Also, research is needed on the emerging trend of tourism development in third
world fishing communities that are 'physically attractive' and offer high-amenities to
foreign tourists. Specifically, the effect of tourism on economic linkages across segments
of the fishing industry and an evaluation of how it might support or marginalize
traditional forms of resource use (such as small-scale fishing) will influence whether
tourism serves as possible stable form of future economic development in these regions.
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